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ITHACA - INTEGRATION, TRANSNATIONAL

MOBILITY AND HUMAN, SOCIAL

AND ECONOMIC CAPITAL TRANSFERS

## **Country Report – UNITED KINGDOM**

**ITHACA Research Report N. 4/2015**

Eugenia Markova

and Sonia McKay

London Metropolitan University



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the European Commission



**EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE  
ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES**

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**EUGENIA MARKOVA AND SONIA MCKAY**

**LONDON METROPOLITAN UNIVERSITY**

**ITHACA PROJECT**

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## **The ITHACA Research Project**

### ***ITHACA - Integration, Transnational Mobility and Human, Social and Economic Capital***

ITHACA studies the links between migrants' integration and their transnational engagement. Migrants engage in transnational mobility for an array of economic reasons as well as emotional or political ties with their country of origin. They develop transnational business, trade, investments, or social and cultural programmes and circulate between their two countries. ITHACA explores the interconnections between the integration process and transnational mobility of migrants and aims to answer three key questions: To what extent, and in what ways, do integration conditions in the country of destination encourage transnational mobility? What are the conditions in the country of origin that may encourage transnational mobility? What type of transfers take place through the transnational mobility of migrants? ITHACA focuses on economic integration and mobility conditions as factors that encourage or prevent transnational mobility.

The ITHACA project is hosted at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies and co-ordinated by Prof. Anna Triandafyllidou (anna.triandafyllidou@eui.eu ). The project is funded by DG Home of the European Commission.

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**The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS)**, at the European University Institute (EUI), directed by Brigid Laffan from September 2013, was set up in 1992 as a complementary initiative to develop inter-disciplinary and comparative research and to promote work on the major issues facing the process of integration and European society. The Centre hosts major research programmes and projects, and a range of working groups and ad hoc initiatives. The research agenda is organised around a set of core themes and is continuously evolving, reflecting the changing agenda of European integration and the expanding membership of the European Union. One of its core themes is Migration.

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## **Executive Summary**

- This report examines the simultaneous processes of migrant integration, transnational mobility and capital transfers through the prism of different typologies of transnationalism, modified and re-shaped by changing personal and family structures/circumstances, migration rules, economic and political developments, in the origin and at the destination.
- The study utilised a wealth of data from 78 Bosnian-Herzegovinian, Ukrainian, Indian and Filipino migrants in the UK, 18 returnees in India and Ukraine, and eight stakeholders. A couple of interviews captured the voice of the migrant second-generation.
- The study showed that transnationalism could exist without physical travel to the origin. Undocumented status prevented transnational mobility but the strong engagement was maintained through the regular remitting and the sending of goods, donating to hospitals, and everyday talking to family members on the phone and social media. On a few occasions, transnational activism was practiced without physical travel.
- There were examples of engagement in different modes of transnational mobility at different stages of respondents' lives. The demanding profile of transnational entrepreneurs was only identified in eight interviewees, Indian and Bosnian. There were transnational activists among the Filipinos, Bosnians and the Ukrainians. Philanthropic activities were registered towards all origin countries in the study, with the largest share of resources flowing to India.
- The representatives of the 'transnational business class' were business graduates, sometimes headhunted and working in the City of London. They seem to be more cosmopolitan than transnational, with limited socio-cultural integration in the host environment. The latter loses significance against their dynamically changing work prospects, subject to migration and family status.
- Overall, there was a broad participation in socio-cultural activities across all studied groups, while economic activities had few participants.
- Physical mobility made transnational engagement much more feasible. Obtaining British citizenship or a permanent status was an important goal of most migration projects. The freedom of movement is likely to outweigh the 'British-ness' objective.
- The integration of Indians and Filipinos in the UK was facilitated by English language proficiency on arrival and India-born in particular had the highly transferable cultural capital. For Filipinos, the social capital was an asset carried from the Philippines or acquired upon arrival through connections with ethnic associations. Filipino workers were identified in several sectors of the economy.

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- Time of arrival in the UK was an important predictor for one's challenges upon arrival in the UK, including obtaining permanent legalisation status, naturalisation, access to housing and employment. The recent years in the UK have been characterised by increasingly restrictive migration rules. As a result, several respondents in high skilled jobs considered moving to countries like the USA and Canada, where they expected more favourable migration policies.
- Frequent travel was related to shorter durations of stay back home. A short annual leave and an anxiety to distribute the time between the home country and elsewhere as well as children at school were all intervening factors. Geographical distance partly explains the frequency of travel and the duration of stay there. It is also an indication of the available means of travel. Bosnian respondents were the most frequent travellers and the only ones that travelled to Bosnia-Herzegovina by car, with the whole family, in the summer.
- Almost all transnational activities were an illustration of the 'transnationalism from below', which is practiced outside any state bilateral agreements or programmes.
- The nature of transnationalism and the frequency of travel evolve in conditions of military conflict - the current one in Ukraine and the past conflict, with spill-over effects through more than 20 years, in Bosnia-Herzegovina - shifting political circumstances, migration rules and macroeconomic conditions.
- Family support during travels between the UK and the origin countries was an important facilitator of transnational mobility. Reverse remittances were registered from parents in the origin who were supporting their children's' post-graduate studies in the UK. The pattern was most persistent among Indian respondents. The subsequent successful economic integration in the UK leads to transnational practices of a passive economic nature in the form of investment in commercial or residential properties, and financial investments.
- The report argues that stable political situations in the home country and lack of conflict are the foundations of transnational mobility. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine appeared to be a significant impediment on the transnational practices in the east of the country (the war zone). The months of turmoil have taken their toll on the country; its struggling economy discourages investment and business activities. Similarly, the war in the former Yugoslavia dating back over 20 years still mars the transnational engagements in the area.
- Conversely, mobility is facilitated by the existence of family and friends in the home country; their assistance is vital for maintaining transnational practices.
- The challenge remains to develop a holistic framework for understanding migrant transnationalism, devoid of - as much as it is feasible - methodological nationalism.

## **Keywords**

Integration, transnational mobility, United Kingdom, Indians, Bosnian-Herzegovinians, Filipinos, Ukrainians, socio-economic capital, investment, remittances.

## **Frequently Used Abbreviations**

### **Countries**

AT	Austria
BIH	Bosnia Herzegovina
ES	Spain
IND	India
IT	Italy
MOR	Morocco
PHI	the Philippines
UK	United Kingdom
UKR	Ukraine

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## **1. Introduction and Scope of the Report**

This report forms part of the Ithaca project, which studies the links between integration and socio-economic transnational activities, forged in the context of mobility or lack of it.

Project aims:

- a) clarify what is transnational mobility and how it relates to transnationalism and,
- b) explore the link between transnational mobility and integration.

The report attempts to achieve these objectives through a simultaneous investigation of migrant integration, transnational mobility, and human, social and economic capital transfers among Bosnians-Herzegovinians, Indians, Filipinos and Ukrainians in the UK and, their respective origin places. In doing so, it utilises a variety of data collected through available secondary statistics, stakeholder interviews and a survey of transnationals both in the UK and the selected countries of origin.

Its theoretical framework blends together Basch et al.'s (1994: 6) seminal definition of transnationalism as "the process by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement"; Knowles' (2003: 171) transnational building of "social fields comprising relationships, visits, communications and, sometimes, long distance participation, across two or more nation state boundaries"; and, Guarnizo's 'transnational living' (2003), to produce the overarching concept of transnational mobility.

Migrant transnational mobility encompasses a wide range of commitments to and relations with home societies, which, while they are successfully integrating in the host society, do not necessarily require physical border crossings of particular frequency. The nature of these commitments and relations vary and particular attention is given to economic and social/cultural transnationalism (Levitt and Jaworsky, 2007). Economic transnationalism involves financial remittances sent to family or friends at home, business ventures that rely on cross-border resources, investments in housing and financial markets, and cross-border travel for work. Social/cultural transnationalism refers to practices like civic engagement in cross-border philanthropic projects or cultural organisations that often work for the betterment of the wider home society and for community relations. The latter type of transnationalism is usually supported through "symbolic commitments to transnational identities regardless of residential location or immigrant status" (Lauer and Wong, 2010: 1054). Transnational mobility and national belonging, and identity are shaped and re-shaped by extreme conditions (e.g., military conflict, current or past), macroeconomic and political developments (regional, national, global), citizenship and local power structures, including class and gender. They, in turn, have the potential to impact beyond the family. The study considers (data

permitting) the life-cycle effects on transnational mobility. Different modes and frequencies of transnational practices are performed in different stages of one's life (Vertovec, 2009).

This report examines integration in the context of transnational mobility. It does not presuppose negative correlations between the two when testing their relations. Recent studies have shown that migrants can be involved simultaneously in several processes of integration, in the host country, in the origin country and in the social fields across/between them (Lacroix, 2013). This statement is further operationalised for quantitative analysis in the core section of the report. The holistic approach to integration by Ager and Strang (2008: 170) is taken as a main reference. The authors distinguish four domains, all assigned equal weight - a) makers and means (employment; housing; education; health); b) social connection (social bridges; social bonds; social links); c) facilitators (language and cultural knowledge; safety and stability); d) foundation (rights and citizenship). This generic model can be adapted to allow for some domains to be valued more than others, particularly if transnational mobility also provides some features of social connection and facilitators. Against the backdrop of evolving relationships between migrants and non-migrants, integration and social changes continuously modify the processes of 'making and re-making of transnational practices' (Lacroix, 2013). Portes et al. (1999) identify an 'alternative adaptation path' for immigrants in developed countries, among the bi-national field created by transnational movements.

The values assigned to the three forms of capital transfers - economic, social and cultural (including human capital) - are understood and interpreted through Pierre Bourdieu's notions of capital that go beyond the economic terminologies of exchange and 'rational choices' (Kelly and Lusic, 2006). Nevertheless, the availability of economic capital remains an important determinant of any significant changes in an individual's life. Economic capital refers to financial assets which are "immediately and directly convertible into money and may be institutionalised in the form of property rights" (Bourdieu, 1986: 243). Social capital is measured by the networks and connection that can be mobilised to generate benefits. "The volume of social capital possessed by a given agent [...] depends on the size of the network of connections he can effectively mobilise and on the volume of the capital (economic, cultural or symbolic) possessed in his own right by each of those to whom he is connected" (Bourdieu, 1986: 249). Clearly, the usefulness of social connections reflects power structures of class and status. Bourdieu's notion of cultural capital as a wider concept is adopted, encompassing human capital. The latter has been conventionally used in economic analysis to define individual investments in schooling, training and the acquisition of general market and economic knowledge for labour market success (Becker, 1964). What is treated as 'human capital' in economic analysis (narrowed down to mean skills and qualifications) is only a part of an individual's cultural capital, which also includes embodied makers based on gender, class and 'race' (Skeggs, 2004 cited in Kelly and Lusic, 2006: 834). Cultural capital encompasses the symbolic

assets that a person possesses. This can be in the form of institutional cultural capital (University/post-graduate degree, professional qualifications), embodied cultural capital, referring to "long-lasting dispositions of the mind and body" (Bourdieu, 1986: 243) like accents and 'race', or objectified cultural capital (for example, dress, physical equipment, an art collection) (Kelly and Lusic, 2006).

The report has six sections. The first section introduces the case study and provides main working definitions of transnationalism, integration and, human, social and economic capital transfers. The second outlines the history of migration to the United Kingdom in the period from the end of the 2<sup>nd</sup> World War to today. It focuses on the migrant communities from Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Ukraine, the Philippines and India, presenting available statistical data on characteristics and integration patterns with regards to migration and labour market policies. The methodology section describes the scope of the fieldwork, sets out the sampling strategy for recruiting respondents, the entry points utilised and the selection criteria used. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis providing insights into the possible typology of transnationalism, the types of mobility for economic purposes, the mechanisms and basic features of transnational mobility, the capital transfers in the context of shifting economic and political conditions in the origin state; it also examines qualitatively the links between integration and transnationalism and, between type of transnationalism and type of mobility. Section 5 outlines profiles of transnationally mobile migrants from the four groups under study, distinguishing between cases of 'fractured economic transnationalism', 'socio-academic transnationalism', 'socio-cultural transnationalism and economic activism' and, 'a socio-economic transnationalism'. The concluding section summarises the findings, emphasising the need for a holistic approach to understanding migrant transnational mobility that accounts for different typologies, evolving through changing migration regulations, political and economic conditions.

## 2. United Kingdom - migration history and current state of affairs

### 2.1 Indians in the UK

#### *State policies*

The post-war migration experience of Indians in the UK, until the 1970s, was broadly determined by changing labour market conditions and changing colonial migration regimes advancing a migration policy promoting settlement and citizenship. The specific history of British colonialism, with its categorisation of the peoples of the colonies as 'subjects', appeared to endorse settlement, particularly in the immediate post 2<sup>nd</sup> World War period. As elsewhere in Europe, this was characterised by acute labour shortages, initially filled with workers from Europe, primarily Italy and Poland. These sources of labour ceased up by the end of the 1940s and the government turned to migration from the Caribbean and then from the newly independent states of India and Pakistan, to work in both the public and the private sectors of the economy. Thus, it was the country's inability to secure sufficient numbers of white workers from Europe that encouraged a change of policy accepting migration from the colonies and ex-colonies. At the same time the status of people from the colonial territories, as subjects of the British Crown, helped to open the door to mass migration after 1945, especially after the adoption of the *British Nationality Act* in 1948, which conferred British citizenship on all who lived in the British Empire and Commonwealth. Soon after, migrants from the West Indies, India and Pakistan began to enter the country (Hansen, 2003; Castles, 2009).

A public notion that nearly everybody could become British and a state funded system to monitor racism and equal opportunities were seen as sufficient policy tools to manage social tensions, although, they were also challenged as forcing 'Anglo-conformation' on minority ethnic groups (Rakar, 2005). Policies were also significantly influenced by developments in North America, with a focus on the identification of racial categories and in the prosecution of racial discrimination. This also meant that policies were promoted to deliver services that were considered specific to the needs of minority ethnic groups (Bleich, 2003). The *1962 Commonwealth Act* severely limited the entry of workers. Family reunion was in turn restricted by the *1971 Immigration Act*. The *1981 Nationality Act* removed British citizenship from the people of Commonwealth countries resulting in a decline in migration in the 1970s and 1980s.

By the mid-1990s, Britain was promoted as a multicultural society, in which different racial, ethnic and religious groups could live peacefully together, and participate to a satisfactory degree in the country's social and political life. But beneath the rhetoric race and multiculturalism remained controversial. Racism, social exclusion and hopelessness simmered leading to riots in Brixton (London) and in the de-

industrialised Northern towns with large Asian minorities like Bradford, Leeds and Blackburn and these highlighted the continuing realities of acute social inequality experienced by the minority ethnic groups. The situation was further exacerbated by the events of 11 September 2001 and the ensuing ‘war on terror’. The invasion of Iraq two years later, and then Afghanistan caused more tensions and the London bombings of 7 July 2005 generated a media discourse in which British Muslims were identified as untrustworthy. Within this highly charged atmosphere those on the ideological right took the opportunity to challenge multiculturalism arguing that it inevitably led to separatism (Bleich, 2003). Zetter et al. (2006) have noted that building good community relations between settled and new immigrant communities has long been stated policy objective of successive UK governments but the emergence of ‘a radically new era of migration’ - the era of ‘super-diversity’ (Vertovec, 2006) – posed major challenges for existing policy frameworks, so that ‘social cohesion’ became the buzz word in debates on race and ethnicity. Social cohesion was interpreted as the term that replaced multiculturalism with an integration model that was designed to achieve both cultural homogeneity and socio-cultural integration. Consequently, citizenship became linked to tests which demonstrated knowledge of ‘Britishness’ and ‘core values’ (Castles, 2009: 29).

### *Statistical data*

Although Indian migration to the UK has a long history, large scale migration began in the 1950s with Indian communities developing in the industrial heartlands of London, the Midlands (Leicester, Birmingham) and the North (Manchester, Liverpool, Bradford). These flows increased in the 1960s and 1970s with the arrival of Indians expelled from Africa by newly independent states, mostly Kenya and Uganda (Table 1).

Since the 1950s, India has figured amongst the top 10 non-UK countries of birth for the resident population in England and Wales while it headed the list in 2011 (Table 2). Among the foreign-born Indian population in England and Wales there are roughly equal numbers of males and females. In 2011, 14,892 births in England and Wales were registered to Indian-born mothers.

From the 1990s, increasing numbers of Indians came to Britain as part of a global trend of the highly skilled mobility, notably engineers and IT specialists. Student mobility also grew as a reflection of its increasing prosperity in India, and the search for educational credentials from highly-regarded universities.

Indian nationals were issued the largest proportion of skilled work visas in the 2007 cohort (37%), and of these skilled nationals, 24% received settlement after five years, while a further 9% still had valid leave to remain in late 2013 (*Migrant journey*: fourth report, 19 February 2014).

**Table 1: Indian-born population in the UK, 1951-1991 & 2009-2010 & 2012-2014**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Number of people</b>
<b>1951</b>	111,000
<b>1961</b>	157,000
<b>1971</b>	313,000
<b>1981</b>	383,000
<b>1991</b>	482,000
.....	.....
<b>2009</b>	661,000
<b>2010</b>	687,000
<b>2012</b>	729,000*
<b>2013</b>	746,000
<b>2014</b>	734,000

*Source:* Office for National Statistics.

Note: \* Comparing the difference between Indian – born residents and Indian nationals in the UK in 2012 (729,000 and 348,000), demonstrates that for those born in India there is an incentive to acquire British citizenship<sup>1</sup>.

**Table 2: Top ten non-UK countries of birth for the resident population in England and Wales, UK Census 2001 and 2011**

<b>Country of birth</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>Country of birth</b>	<b>2011</b>
Ireland	473,000	India	694,000
India	456,000	Poland	579,000
Pakistan	308,000	Pakistan	482,000
Germany	244,000	Ireland	407,000
Bangladesh	153,000	Germany	274,000
Jamaica	146,000	Bangladesh	212,000
USA	144,000	Nigeria	191,000
South Africa	132,000	South Africa	191,000
Kenya	127,000	USA	177,000
Italy	102,000	Jamaica	160,000

*Source:* Office for National Statistics.

<sup>1</sup> Office for National Statistics (2014) *Population by Country of Birth and Nationality Report*, August 2014.

### *Demographic and labour market characteristics*

Indians display considerable religious diversity, with the majority in the UK (n=622,000) declaring themselves as Hindus in the 2011 Census, followed by Sikh, Muslim, Christian, with very small numbers of Buddhists and other religions or 'religion not stated'. Hindu mandirs, Sikh gurdwaras and Muslim mosques have become common throughout England (Peach, 2006).

The largest sectors of employment for those of Indian origin are health and social work and, the wholesale and retail trade<sup>2</sup> and in both these sectors the proportions are higher for Indian-origin workers (17.3% and 16.6% respectively) while the corresponding proportions for white workers are 12.8% and 13.3%. In the period 2009-2013, the highest share of Indian-born employment was in 2010, with 8.4% of the total foreign-born nationals in employment.

Workers from India have an employment rate in the UK of 71% and an unemployment rate of 9%, compared to 73% and 7% respectively for white workers<sup>3</sup>. For women workers, the corresponding rates for those from India are 64% and 9% compared to 69% and 6% for white women. Those from the Indian sub-continent have an unemployment rate of 10% compared to 6% for the white population.

### *Indian associations in the UK and their transnational engagement*

Lacroix (2011) argues that the evolution of the Indian associations in the UK can be divided into 'three ages':

*1<sup>st</sup>: The early organisations of the 1950s and 1960s* provided self-help for single migrant workers. They were based on traditional village ties.

*2<sup>nd</sup>: During the 1960s-90s* aligned to family reunion, welfare needs and cultural associations, Indian associations grew in significance and became more diverse in their characteristics and functions. They were mainly religion-based, and emphasised educational tasks, cultural maintenance and the preservation of religious values and practices.

*3<sup>rd</sup>: Since the turn of the new century* often the creation of highly skilled and successful second and third generation descendants of Indian immigrants as well as newer professional migrants. New types of associations have been established transcending traditional boundaries of village and

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<sup>2</sup> [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/271415/nino-statistical-bulletin-aug-13.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/271415/nino-statistical-bulletin-aug-13.pdf)

<sup>3</sup> <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/labour-market-status-by-ethnic-group>

clan. These more recent forms of association pursue developmental, religious and political goals, and use new modes of communication such as the Internet and mobile phones. They see themselves as Diaspora members, concerned to develop their transnational identities, and to rediscover their homeland roots, while pursuing their careers in advanced economies.

A sizeable Indian civil society started to emerge in the UK the 1960s, when religious, welfare and cultural organisations were set up by Indian settlers in Britain to meet the needs of a growing population. Religious and community self-help organisations still constitute the bulk of Indian associations. From the 1990s there has also been the emergence of some organisations associated with the extreme right in India (Lacroix, 211).

The directions of the transnational connections themselves vary greatly. They can be trans-local, in particular in the case of small development projects, trans-state or even global. A specific characteristic of the Indian Diaspora is that it maintains ties not only with the origin country, but also with people of Indian origin in the main receiving countries (USA, Canada, among others) or even with former important host countries (in the case of development projects in Eastern Africa). Development projects supported in Kenya or Uganda by Indian organisations illustrate this characteristic (ibid). Indians remain both a well-integrated part of the British population and an important Diaspora group, actively engaged in the economic, cultural and political affairs of India.

## ***2.2 Bosnians-Herzegovinians in the UK***

### *State policies*

In the early 1990s, there was a large-scale movement of refugees within Europe as a result of the break-up of Yugoslavia and the fall of the Berlin Wall. Britain responded to the rising numbers of asylum seekers by introducing visa restrictions in November 1992. This effectively ended legal entry to Britain for refugees from the former Yugoslavia. However, under pressure from the UNHCR, the government agreed that it would accept a quota of refugees and a programme (the Bosnia Proect) was established for their entry to Britain with the status of temporary protection (Kelly, 2003). The state presumption was that refugees would be repatriated when the crisis was over, avoiding the need for developing integration and settlement policies (ibid). Contrary to state expectations, the conflict in the former Yugoslavia lasted several years and the majority of those admitted to Britain under temporary protection measures did not return.

### *Statistical data*

Valenta and Ramet (2010) report the presence of 4,100 Bosnian refugees in the UK and Ireland in the period 1992-2005; 100 changed country of reception and 1,000 were repatriated to Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Bosnian Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees registered 10,000 Bosnians in the UK in 2008 and the 2011 UK Census - 8,000 in England and Wales; 66% had arrived between 1992-96 (ONS, 2013). In the same Census year, 167 births to Bosnian-born mothers were registered.

There is no separate statistical data on the UK Bosnian labour force. The official data on National Insurance numbers details nationals of the top 20 countries only and thus do not include Bosnia<sup>4</sup>. A combination of low numbers of persons settled in the UK and a low response rate to the Labour Force Survey explain the lack of data<sup>5</sup>.

### *Demographic and labour market characteristics*

The majority of Bosnians in the UK are Sunni Muslims. No studies were found profiling the demographic and labour market characteristics of Bosnian-Herzegovinians born in the UK.

### *Bosnian associations in the UK and transnational engagement<sup>6</sup>:*

In the case of refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina who came to the UK as part of the *Bosnia Project*, policies were adopted at an early stage. By 2002, formal community associations were established in most areas of the country where there were at least 60 Bosnians. The individual community associations varied in their activities, degree of organization, size and level of funding. In many cases, associations faced considerable difficulties, including internal divisions, factionalism, infighting and a shortage of people willing to devote large amounts of time to the association. The majority of people had to become familiar with the notion of community association through the *Bosnia project* as they had no similar past experience (Kelly, 2003). Bosnians were often reliant on others for tasks such as interpreting and form-filling, but the absence of kinship and friendship networks meant that many Bosnians did not feel group-wide obligations.

For most Bosnians-Herzegovinians in that period there had been little or no choice over the country they were brought to. Those who came to the UK rarely came to join family or friends and, although some had

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<sup>4</sup> [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/271415/nino-statistical-bulletin-aug-13.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/271415/nino-statistical-bulletin-aug-13.pdf)

<sup>5</sup> Office for National Statistics (2010), *Survey methodology bulletin* file:///C:/Users/owner/Downloads/smb63\_tcm77-275180.pdf

<sup>6</sup> Kelly (2003:42-44)

family members that were also allowed to travel to the UK, most found that their pre-war kinship and friendship links were severely disrupted or totally destroyed (ibid).

### ***2.3 Filipinos in the UK***

#### *Statistical data*

Prior to the 1970s the number of Filipinos in the UK was small. As immigration entry from the old colonies was limited, labour market shortages began to develop and Filipino migration began in response, mainly supplying workers to the health sector. Filipinos are also found working in hotels and catering and the population is characterised by being majority female, with 76,000 females born in the Philippines, compared to 52,000 males. In 2013, there were 129,000 Filipino-born in employment in the UK, of which 74,000 were women. The total number peaked in the last decade. Of the 140,000 residents in 2011, 64% had arrived in the period 2001-2009. In 2011, there were 2,870 births registered to Philippines-born mothers in the UK. Much of this migration is fuelled by economic uncertainty in the Philippines. In 2012, 8,122 Philippines-born (out of 194,209) were granted British citizenship. In 2012 the Philippines was the fourth highest country for visa issue to the UK, coming immediately after India, Australia and the USA (*Immigration Statistics, 2014*<sup>7</sup>).

#### *Demographic and labour market characteristics*

According to the last Census in 2011, most Filipinos define themselves as Roman Catholics, followed by Protestants, Buddhists and a fraction of Muslims and Atheists (ONS, 2013). There is no official data on home ownership or marriage.

There is little published official data on the educational attainment levels of the children of Filipinos. Filipinos are included within the category 'Any other Asian background' and these show that this category has a 62% performance in attaining at least five A-C level qualifications compared to 58.2 for the white British group<sup>8</sup>. One study suggests that children from the Philippines tend to form friendships within their ethnic group (Reynolds, 2008).

According to the Institute for Public Policy Research (Kyambi, 2005), 85.4% of the working age new immigrant Filipinos in the UK are employed (as opposed to inactive - a category which includes students

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<sup>7</sup><https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/immigration-statistics-january-to-march-2014/immigration-statistics-january-to-march-2014>

<sup>8</sup> <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/gcse-and-equivalent-attainment-by-pupil-characteristics-in-england-2010-to-2011>

or unemployed), with 12.8% being low earners (people earning less than £149.20 a week – half the UK median wage) and 0.61% are high earners (people earning more than £750 a week); 77.91% of settled Filipino immigrants in the UK are employed, with 15.38% being low earners and 1.28% being high earners. More than one in ten Filipinos in the UK is working in the health service. The UWT Research Project (LMU/WLRI<sup>9</sup>) 2007-9 interviewed a number of Filipino migrants working in the care sector and found examples of harassment, bullying and unequal treatment.

### *Filipino associations in the UK*

The largest Filipino community in the United Kingdom is found in and around London. Other towns and cities with significant Filipino communities include Birmingham, Liverpool, Manchester, Leeds and, and Barrow-in-Furness, which is home to an extremely successful Filipino community.

Fiestas are held during the months of July and August in various cities throughout the UK. The '*Barrio Fiesta in London*', a two-day festival held in Lampton Park, West London, is the best known and the largest gathering for the community in the UK. It is organised and run by The Philippine Centre but draws Filipino community groups and businesses from all over the UK. It has been running for 25 years<sup>10</sup>.

## **2.4 Ukrainians in the UK**

### *Statistical data*<sup>11</sup>

A small Ukrainian community was already established in the period prior to and immediately following the 2<sup>nd</sup> World War, based mainly in the Manchester and Bradford areas of the North of England, working in the cloth mills. The 2001 Census counted 11,448 people born in the Ukraine (28% of whom lived in London), while in the 2011 Census, the corresponding figure was 22,000 (an average growth rate of 92%). There are more than twice as many females as males within the Ukrainian born group; 712 births to Ukrainian-born mothers were registered in 2011 in the UK (ONS, 2013).

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<sup>9</sup> McKay, S. Markova, E. Paraskevopoulou, A. and Wright, T. (2009) *The relationship between migration status and employment outcomes*, <http://www.undocumentedmigrants.eu/fms/MRSite/Research/UWT/UWT%20FINAL%20REPORT%20Revised%2021%20November%202009mw.pdf>

<sup>10</sup> <http://centreforfilipinos.org>

<sup>11</sup> Kelly, L. (2003)

### *Demographic and labour market characteristics*

A report by Markova and Black (2007) found that the primary reasons for Ukrainians coming to London, for those who had arrived since the start of the Millennium were economic. Wages generally were found to be low, with only 13% earning more than £1,500 a month.

There is no official data on religion, home ownership or marriage in relation to Ukrainian migrants.

The limited data available suggests that second generation Ukrainians have achieved educational qualifications at least as high as those of the white British population<sup>12</sup>. It is estimated that around 14,000 Ukrainian born are currently working in the UK. The figure might be a significant underestimate of the working population in the UK as it certainly does not include the figure of those working illegally or on forged passports.

There is no official data on National Insurance numbers again due to the small size of the population. A report by the Trades Union Congress (2004<sup>13</sup>) found evidence of harsh and poor working conditions among Ukrainians.

### *Ukrainian Associations in the UK and their transnational engagement*

Community movements tend to have developed slowly over time and it is not possible to link them with political conflicts. Markova and Black (2007) found that 30% of their sample was involved in volunteering, reporting that they had provided help to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church; a high level of political participation was registered, with three being members of Ukrainian political parties and two more being members of UK political parties.

## **3. Methodology: fieldwork and data**

Desk research was conducted – review of relevant previous studies and secondary data analysis - to provide a background context for the four groups - Bosnians- Herzegovinians, Filipinos, Indians, and Ukrainians, their characteristics and demographics, paths of integration, transnational practices, capital transfers, and membership in associations. It informed the design of the research tools and the sampling strategy.

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<sup>12</sup> *Ukrainians in the UK – on line encyclopedia*: <http://www.ukrainiansintheuk.info/eng/01/ukrinuk-e.htm>

<sup>13</sup> <https://www.tuc.org.uk/international-issues/migration/gone-west-%E2%80%93-harsh-reality-ukrainians-work-uk>

Primary data was collected through a combination of a questionnaire survey of respondents from the four groups and stakeholder interviews. The questionnaire contained both closed questions to allow for some profiling of the sample, and open questions where respondents provide insights into their experiences of transnationalism and integration in the UK. A topic guide with open questions and prompts was developed for interviewing stakeholders. It should be acknowledged that the questions of transnationalism and in particular its links with integration were hard to track in respondents' narratives and when speaking with civil society actors.

The questionnaire survey comprised a purposive, non-probability quota sample of 96 respondents, 78 migrants in the UK and 18 returnees from the UK, from the four migrant groups: Indians (n=52, including 17 returnees), Filipinos (n=20), Ukrainians (n=11, including one returnee), and Bosnians-Herzegovinians (n=13). Two of the Filipino respondents in the UK were interviewed - over Skype and Facebook video calls - by the Researcher based in the Philippines. Another 15 interviews with returnees were conducted in India and one in the Ukraine. The sample is broadly stratified by gender.

Additional stratification aimed at ensuring representation of different national sub-groups was attempted in the Bosnian and Ukrainian samples. This was not entirely achieved due to limited resources and lack of availability of respondents. In the former, the strategy aimed to balance the inclusion of Bosnian Serbs and Muslims; with regards to the latter, the objective was to include proportionate representation of respondents from Eastern Ukraine (the war zone) and the rest of the country. A more regional perspective, arguably tacking to a degree the methodological nationalism, was adopted in the case of India when examining both the sense of belonging of the Indian-born respondents and their contributions to development. Across much of India, regions are recognised as "salient socio-special categories, characterised by distinct histories, languages or cultural configurations" (Upadhy and Rutten, 2012: 59). Similar approach was attempted at studying the transnational mobility of the Filipinos.

Eight stakeholders were interviewed to acquire a better understanding of relevant policies and civil society programmes. The stakeholders provided useful initial contacts within the respective groups under study. We interviewed representatives of the British Red Cross, the Ukrainian Migrants Network, the Kanlungan Centre Foundation Inc. and Justice for Domestic Workers Ltd., the Bosnian Embassy in London, the Migrant Rights Network, and the Balkan "Magaza" shop. The Migrants Resource Centre, even though not included in the list of interviewed stakeholders, provided important entry points in to the communities under study.

The demographic characteristics of the sample were determined by the adopted sampling strategy, the definition of transnationally mobile migrants and the ease of access to those respondents (Table 3).

The skewed educational distribution of the sample is partly explained by the definition of economic transnationalism that was deployed by the survey. Higher education as a signifier of certain wealth emerges as an important determinant of transnational economic behaviour. This, in turn, suggests that higher educated, higher skilled individuals are more open to direct contact; they are more likely to be found in University and business settings. They are more likely to respond positively to a request for a participation in a survey, being part of the 'new cast of characters' of cosmopolitanism (Robbins, 1998: 1).

The initial sampling strategy required gender balance among all groups. Yet, difficulties recruiting male respondents in the Filipino and the Ukrainian samples shaped the final sample with some prevalence of women, 56% (n=55) and men - 44% (n=44).

The average age of respondents was 40 years. The two extreme cases were found in the Indian sample, with the youngest respondent being 19 years of age and the oldest - 82 years.

The overall sample is severely skewed towards high levels of education, with almost 90% of all respondents possessing University and a post-graduate qualification, often obtained in both the UK and the origin country (n=58) or in a third country (the Philippines for an Indian, Australia, Canada, Israel and Hong Kong). Twenty nine respondents completed their education at home. The Filipino sample is dominated by almost a third of University graduates (n=12), with education completed at home and a quarter of post-graduates who studied in the UK; 80 percent of the Indian respondents had post-graduate qualifications either from the UK/another country or from the UK and India; half of the Ukrainian sample are post-graduates and the other have holds University diploma with only one respondent with vocational training; nine of the Bosnians hold either university or a post-graduate diploma. A large number of Indian and Ukrainian high-skilled respondents (university lecturers, researchers, business people and bankers) had entered the UK in the mid-2000s, through the Highly Skilled Migration Programme (HSMP) route or had benefited from the post-studies employment options. Low skilled Ukrainians are mainly on forged Polish or Hungarian passports therefore avoiding trips to the origin and more reluctant to participate in surveys.

Fifty-nine interviewees were married or cohabiting; forty-two of them were living with their partners in the UK; five Indians and one Bosnian had their partners and children in the origin country while eight of the returnees in India were living with their spouses there. Four Filipino respondents and one Ukrainian had children in the origin countries. Almost half of the Indians and more than half of the Bosnians in the sample were single or separated/divorced.

Eighty-two of the respondents originated from urban areas; the remaining 14 came from rural areas in India and the Philippines. Four of the Ukrainian respondents were born and still had families in the war

zone of Crimea. Respondents from today's Bosnia-Herzegovina and Ukraine, in their 30s and 40s, reported being born in the former Yugoslavia or the former USSR respectively<sup>14</sup>.

**Table 3: Demographic profiling of the sample**

	<b>Bosnia</b>	<b>India</b>	<b>Philippines</b>	<b>Ukraine</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Gender:</b>					
-Male	7	25	7	4	<b>43</b>
-Female	6	27	13	7	<b>53</b>
<b>Average age:</b>	39	39	44	39	<b>40</b>
<b>Education:</b>					
- Primary school	0	0	0	0	<b>0</b>
- Secondary school	1	1	1	0	<b>3</b>
-Vocational	1	1	0	1	<b>3</b>
-College	2	1	2	0	<b>5</b>
- University	6	8	12	5	<b>31</b>
- Post-Graduate	3	42	5	5	<b>55</b>
<b>Marital status:</b>					
-Married/co- habiting	6	27	17	8	<b>58</b>
-Single					
-Divorced;	6	21	1	2	<b>30</b>
widowed/separated	1	4	2	1	<b>8</b>

*Source:* UK Field Survey; surveys of returnees in India and Ukraine.

Forty respondents held dual citizenship; twelve of them were of Indian origin (Table 4). They either held Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI) or the Person of Indian Origin (PIO)<sup>15</sup> cards. In August 2005, The Citizenship Act of 1955 was amended to introduce the Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI) scheme, in response of a growing demand for dual citizenship by the Indian Diaspora in North America and other

<sup>14</sup> Union of the Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR)

<sup>15</sup> On January 9, 2015, the Person of Indian Origin card scheme was withdrawn by the Government of India and was merged with the Overseas Citizen of India card scheme (Government of India Gazette Notification No 11, available at: <http://indiacgny.org/pages.php?id=937>)

developed countries<sup>16</sup>. The UK government considers that, for purposes of the British Nationality Act 1981, "OCI is considered to be citizenship of another State"<sup>17</sup>.

**Table 4: Dual citizenship by country of origin**

	BIH	IND	PHI	UKR	TOT
<b>Without dual citizenship</b>	4	40	9	5	<b>58</b>
<b>With dual citizenship</b>	9	12	11	6	<b>38</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	13	52	20	11	<b>96</b>

*Source:* UK Field Survey; surveys of returnees in India and Ukraine.

One Bosnian respondent held a Slovenian-Bosnian passport while two others were Australian - Bosnian. The Bosnian respondents, who had arrived as asylum seekers in the UK in the early 1990s, all held British passports as was the case for Filipinos and Ukrainians who arrived in the UK in the 1990s and the early 2000s.

In terms of knowledge of languages, before and after migration, most spoke the same languages they spoke on arrival, with some improvement in their English. Knowledge of languages, particularly among Indian and Filipino respondents, was related to regional diversity in both countries, where each region is characterised by linguistic and cultural specificities. Colonial ties of both countries, with the UK and the USA respectively, explain their English proficiency; different accents point to class membership in the origin areas. Some Indian respondents talked about English having been the language spoken at home and with friends, in social circles and throughout their education. Similarly, a fraction of Filipino respondents had attended English medium schools in their country of origin. For them, coming to the UK has contributed to mastering their British English as opposed to English-American.

The fieldwork started in mid-June 2014 and a third of the interviews were completed by early August 2014. The remaining interviews were conducted between October 2014 and April 2015. Very little snowballing was applied in recruiting the respondents in the UK (see Recruitment Tree in Appendix II).

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<sup>16</sup> The scheme was launched during the Pravasi Bharatiya Divas convention at Hyderabad in 2006. Indian authorities have interpreted the law to mean a person cannot have a second country's passport simultaneously with an Indian one — even in the case of a child who is claimed by another country as a citizen of that country, and who may be required by the laws of the other country to use one of its passports for foreign travel, and the Indian courts have given the executive branch wide discretion over this matter (Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, available at: [http://mha.nic.in/uniquepage.asp?Id\\_Pk=553](http://mha.nic.in/uniquepage.asp?Id_Pk=553))

<sup>17</sup> [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/262267/ch14annexh.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/262267/ch14annexh.pdf)

Regular travel - at least once in two years - between the origin and destination was adopted initially as the fundamental indicator of transnational mobility, making economic involvement in the home area more feasible. Following a discussion within the partnership, the definition was relaxed to include economic transnationalism without physical movement. Only three such cases were included in the UK sample.

London - a financial and business centre, with a diverse range of people and cultures - provided a unique setting for recruiting transnationally economically active and mobile respondents from the four groups. Many were accessed through professional and personal contacts *The Migrants Resource Centre* advertised widely the ITHACA project amongst partner institutions and colleagues. A diverse range of entry points was used for accessing both Indian and Ukrainian interviewees, including direct approaches.

The bulk of interviews were conducted face-to-face in coffee shops, community centres, libraries in London and Brighton (UK), New Delhi (India) and Lviv (the interview in Ukraine). Phone and Skype interviews proved to be a viable environmental and cost-effective option that allowed for a wide geographical spread of respondents: Bristol, Lancaster, Manchester, Oxford, Salisbury, Guildford and outer London in the UK; Kolkata, Bangalore city and Mumbai in India; and, the two interviews in the Philippines with respondent based in the UK. The interviews lasted from thirty minutes to two hours. The usual duration was about 45 minutes. English was used in 93% of the interviews; one interview was conducted in Arabic through a translator, a couple of interviews switched between Russian and English, and Serbian and English; the interview in Lviv was conducted in Ukrainian. All interview transcripts are available in English.

The following section discusses the results of the qualitative analysis aimed at exploring the types and mechanisms of transnational engagement and its links with integration in the UK.

#### **4. Empirical analysis**

The data collected from the questionnaire survey of the transnationally mobile migrants from the groups under study and the in-depth interviews with relevant stakeholders was utilised to provide insights into the types of transnational mobility, the mechanisms of engagement with the origin and their links with integration in the UK.

#### ***4.1 Exploring transnational mobility***

Any typology of transnationally mobile migrants appears transient and 'liquid' (Bauman, 2003), with often overlapping characteristics. Its durability is frail and easily changeable throughout the life-cycle and under the burden of politico-economic changes in the destination and at home (the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and the shadows of the war in the former Yugoslavia).

##### *Transnationalism without physical mobility*

Three respondents had not been back to the home country since arrival in the UK but maintained transnational activities. An undocumented Filipino transnational in the UK for 1.5 years had lost her legal status after escaping slavery conditions in the home of an Arab diplomat who had brought her from Dubai; she maintains regular contact with home (her sister looks after her 13 year old son; sends money every month; and is saving money to buy land for her father's banana plantation which he currently rents). Legal status is the most significant impediment to transnational mobility. A second 'immobile transnational' is a Filipino female activist concerned for her safety if she was to return; she is actively involved in organising donations to charities and community projects back at home. The third, a Ukrainian male activist has not been back in over 20 years fearing for his safety. He has been actively involved in organising collective donations and remittances for the Ukrainian army since the start of the conflict. Additionally, a Filipino homosexual male, activist for equal rights, has been back only once in seven years to attend a conference, under guaranteed state protection.

##### *Typologies of transnational engagement and mobility*

Respondents seem to engage in different modes of transnational mobility at different stages of their lives. A Ukrainian respondent had started as socio-cultural transnationalist visiting family and friends in the first years of migration to the UK; with duration of residence in the destination and capital accumulation increasing, she and her husband became economically active with contacts in both countries and, a tea trade business in Kiev; corruption at the Polish-Ukrainian border closed the businesses and they returned to their initial activity of visiting family and friends back home. Frequent travel for work in the home region was exchanged for a managerial position in a bank for a woman who had started a family; her visits to Ukraine became only family-oriented. We provide a set of typologies below developed as the result of analysing the data.

The most demanding profile was of ***transnational entrepreneurs*** - defined by Drori et al. (2009: 1001) as "social actors who enact networks, ideas, information, and practices for the purpose of seeking business opportunities or maintaining businesses within dual social fields, which in turn force them to engage in

varied strategies of action to promote their entrepreneurial activities" - was met by six Indian and two Bosnian respondents in the UK sample; four of the Indian transnational entrepreneurs were men, had significantly higher incomes than the average immigrant, and all were well-educated; two of them were long settlers in the UK, one was naturalised, the other two were holders of an Overseas Citizen of India card; the fourth was a recent arrival struggling to acquire a more permanent legal status to allow him greater mobility. The two Indian women were importing leather, oils, henna and other local materials for their businesses in the UK. The Bosnian respondents were two family members, father and son, who, following the outbreak of war, had arrived in the UK in the mid-1990s, one as an asylum seeker (minor), the other one (the father) as a dependent family member.

***Transnational (economic) activists*** – whom we defined as those involved in sending remittances for individual relief projects and collective transfers for wider community initiatives. Examples include the 'collective remittances' of Bosnian migrants in support of those affected by the floods last summer and Filipino people sending money to the victims of typhoon Haiyan in the northern part of the country. Their projects were successful as they had links inside the countries, which were channelling the donations to people in need and reporting back to them. The ongoing efforts of the Ukrainian people in the UK collecting clothes, money and medicines for soldiers (driving vans across Europe to deliver them themselves) is another example. A Bosnian activist shared her experiences of transnational activism:

*Last year when we had the financial crisis first in February then the natural disaster of the floods in May, I and other Bosnian people organised a Bosnian solidarity group in Brighton. We organised events in London & at Brighton University - connecting via Skype with NGOs on the front line in Bosnia - to spread the word of what people were going through there, to organise collective support with clothes, medicines but most importantly, to create this platform of researchers, practitioners in the UK and Bosnia-Herzegovina, to make sense of the events, to mobilise help. It was also a way to bring the insiders' perspective & raise awareness how people can help.*

Diaspora philanthropy has been identified as an increasingly significant modality of migrant resource transfers towards India, encompassing a wide range of activities such as donations to religious institutions, support to NGOs or charities, and other individual initiatives (Upadhyaya and Rutten, 2012). Philanthropic activities were registered towards all countries, with the largest share of resources flowing to India. Donations are regularly sent to a school for underprivileged children (where a friend of an Indian interviewee is a trustee); another respondent built a temple in his parents' village; and, another one sends regular donations for the support of two children in an orphanage.

*I run a charity and we are sending money to India to orphanages and wherever is needed; when I go to India, I visit those places where the money was sent. Our charity got an endowment, which we invest here, in the UK, and the profits are sent to India.*

A Ukrainian couple was supporting a religious organisation in Ukraine (they had been members of it since their student days). A Filipino woman was sending donations to the hospital where her mother was treated and had passed away. A respondent from Sarajevo in Bosnia is involved in a collective initiative of 12 people who are supporting 12 families to cover their monthly shopping expenses (each member of the initiative buys the shopping for one month in the year). The same respondent has raised money to build a house for an elderly couple. Last year he raised £1,500 for the floods in Bosnia. *I take the money myself to go where they are meant to go; the corruption is too high to risk it*, he said.

**Academic transnationalists** - those travelling to attend conferences in the origin areas, conduct research or deliver lectures in their home university institutions. In addition to nostalgia motives and national loyalties, migrant professionals appear to share a sense of obligation to give back to the institutions that educated them. This is always combined with family visits. This type of mobility is perceived by many as beneficial for planning a potential return to the home labour market within the space of one's working life. Academic returnees in India would travel to the UK or elsewhere in Europe or America to give papers at conferences and maintain their global networks.

*It is important to refresh old professional contacts, create new ones and generally, keep up with developments in my area of expertise.*

**'Transnational business class'** (shares some similarities with Sklair's (2001) 'transnational capitalist class', described by Yeoh and Huang (2011) as 'sojourners in London' or 'club class migrant(s)' by Knowles (2003) - MBA graduates, with professional, technical or managerial skills, in their mid-late 20s to early 40s, 'headhunted' for corporate jobs in the City of London. Most arrived in the UK during the early 2000s when immigration rules were more lax, making use of the legal route offered by the Highly Skilled Immigration Programme (subsequently scrapped by the Conservative government). This model of transnational mobility changes adversely for women when they start a family.

Transnational business people are economically successful in London. They invest in their origin countries - in real estate and/or in financial markets; they send money home for mortgages and family investments; their parents or siblings rarely need to be financially supported. A distinct feature of the 'club class migrant' is their limited socio-cultural integration in the host environment; they are enclaved in professional clubs, schools and leisure centres (several Ukrainian and Indian respondents in the sample).

An Indian man, head-hunted for the games industry in London, did not see the need for integration as he was uncertain about his next work placement:

*I can be in America next month, depending where I will be offered the best work conditions and opportunities for advancement. I want to be a CEO by 35.*

Family status plays a significant role in the integration process of this type of transnationalists. A Ukrainian businesswoman spoke of the changes in her life as a result of becoming a mother:

*As an investment banker I used to travel for work 4-5 times a month. I felt I belonged nowhere and I was most comfortable on the plane. When I got married and had my child, I decided my home was in London.*

**Socio-cultural and spiritual transnationalists** - most respondents with children in the UK (except the Ukrainians from the war zone who were unable to) would return to their origin countries for an extended period during the summer holidays, when they bring children to visit relatives, travel to new areas in the country and for everybody to 'consolidate' and 're-connect' with their roots. Two Indian men reported going back on a pilgrimage, once a year. Overall, there is a broad participation in socio-cultural activities across all migrant groups in the sample, while economic activities have fewer participants. *It is a good experience of the mind to combine both systems (home & host) of doing things.*

Transnational mobility for economic purposes emerged as a secondary motivation for visiting the country by all respondents in the sample. The primary drive for mobility in most cases was the existence of family and friends in the origin. Almost all of the respondents in the UK sample said they were dealing with family issues when going back to their home countries while 46 (57% of the sample) were taking care of family property and other economic issues. Several respondents mentioned having healthy parents who would deal with property, bureaucratic and economic issues back at home.

Our initial definition of transnationally mobile migrants required that the person had to have been back home at least once in the past two years, to qualify for inclusion in the sample. As this proved very difficult to achieve, the definition was relaxed to also include people who have travelled back home but not necessarily in the past two years while maintaining commitments to home. Six respondents fell in that category. These were Filipino and Indian people - some had gone to visit relatives in third countries (USA or Europe), others were taken elsewhere by professional commitments; a Filipino family of three young children spoke of expensive, unaffordable trips for five and of the difficulties of taking the children out of school. The remaining interviewees reported a great variation in the number of times each of them had

visited their home country in the past two years, from once to 15 times (almost three times, on average; the mean number of times was two<sup>18</sup>). The most frequent travellers, who have been back 10-15 times, for short visits, in the past two years, were two Bosnian men; one has been going back to Sarajevo to satiate his cultural needs for music and performances (he has is no immediate family there) while the other has been travelling across the former Yugoslavia to bring products for his grocery shop in London.

Frequent travel was related to shorter durations of stay back home. Many interviewees in waged employment spoke of a short annual leave, which they would divide between the home country and elsewhere for holidays.

*I can't rest when I go home, so many problems to listen to, people are sad because of the war. I used to go there to rest. I now need holidays after going there,* a Ukrainian woman lamented. Geographical distance partly explains the frequency of travel and the duration of stay there. Bosnian respondents in the sample appeared to be the most frequent travellers, with an average length of stay of 2.6 weeks several times a year while Filipinos were spending, on average a month in two years. Similarly, Indian and Ukrainian respondents were going home for an average of slightly over three weeks. Half of the respondents were going back to their place of birth, which was also the place of their previous residence, followed by those who were going to other places either for field work (research), holidays or to introduce children to historical sites and new geographical locations.

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<sup>18</sup> The mean is a more appropriate measure of trend given the great variation in answers due to several extreme points.

**Table 5: Summary of qualitative findings on the relationship between transnational physical mobility and transnational engagement**

Transnational engagement	Forms of mobility		
	Intensive Transnational Mobility (more than 3 times a year)	Moderate Transnational Mobility (1-2 times per year)	Limited Transnational Mobility (less than one a year)
<b>Remitting</b> for family maintenance/ education/ repairs etc.		Ukrainian, Bosnian and Indian respondents remitting money to family or taking it themselves when visiting.	14 people, mainly Filipino, reported remitting once a month, on a regular basis (sent to relatives or siblings/parent for the care of children left behind) and 65 people were sending money from time to time (mainly to support the subsistence needs of parents, siblings; for the education of siblings' children or other relatives). In the Filipino case, in particular, sending money was seen more as a social obligation. Often, it can be a drain on resources. Half of the Filipino respondents reported sending money to support their parents, almost a third - to other relatives, followed by those sending to their children left behind.
<b>Economic investment</b> in business or shop in the country of origin	* Bosnian respondents buying supplies for shop in the UK. * Failed attempt by Bosnian businessman to produce shirts in Bosnia.	*Four Filipino and four Indian migrants were sending money as contributions to the State Social Security Fund, hoping to cash it on retirement there. * The two Indian women were importing leather, oils, henna and other local materials for their businesses in the UK.	*Indian man running advertising/publishing company across UK and India.
<b>Developing philanthropic project/ running NGO/ academic transnationalism</b>	* A respondent from Sarajevo in Bosnia involved in a collective initiative of 12 people supporting 12 families to cover their monthly shopping expenses (each member of the initiative buys the shopping for one month in the year). *The same respondent raised money to build a house for an elderly couple. Last year he raised £1,500 for the floods in	* Bosnians sending 'collective remittances' in support of victims of floods and financial hardship * Donations are regularly sent to a school for underprivileged children, a children's home for street children by an Indian interviewee * Another respondent built a temple in his parents' village; and, another one sends	*Filipinos sending money to alleviate suffering of victims of typhoon Haiyan in north of country.

Bosnia. He travels back on average 7-8 times/year. regular donations for the support of two children in an orphanage.  
\*Ukrainian couple supporting religious organisation in Ukraine.  
\*Indians going back to attend conferences, give lectures at old institutions, collect data for research.

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*Note:* \*Forty respondents never sent money, which may reflect their class position of not needing to provide financially for family left behind; 14 of them were of Indian origin. Cultural norms as a partial explanation to that were revealed in the narrative of a Indian woman in her 30s. *I can only bring gifts and the money I spend there. My father does not want my money. I am his daughter and he regards getting money from me as shameful. It is cultural.* For another Indian woman, sending money only to her husband's family was rooted in cultural and cast specificities. Others were sending gifts only.

*Link between type of transnationalism and type of mobility (mechanisms, facilitators of and impediments to transnational engagement)*

Knowles (2003) assigns an important role to the phase of arrival in the migrant journey. To her, the arrival marks both the end of a journey and the beginning of another, which is the life in the host country (Knowles, 2009). It is also the beginning of a transnational life, and the construction of the transnational fields between the place of departure and the UK, with branches to other places. It is the administrative circumstances of arrival in Britain and elsewhere, Knowles (2003: 162) argues, that are highly disadvantageous to migrants and tourists from certain regions. On the question of his satisfaction with the conditions of travelling between UK, India and other places, a young Indian professional, a recent arrival to London, spoke with bitterness about the experiences with the immigration officers every time he arrives in Britain.

*I wish it was easier. I don't like going through immigration - a few questions but at the end of the day I work here as a skilled worker, I am paying taxes [...] it is annoying and it is humiliating. I am on a visa that ties me up with an employer. I am not allowed to circulate. I need a visa for every country in Europe.*

For many respondents in the sample, one of the important goals of settling in the UK was to obtain British citizenship or a permanent residence status that would pave the way for their transnational mobility. This involved not only travel to the home country but also the freedom to go anywhere in the world. Physical mobility makes transnational engagement much more feasible. It enables people to follow up on their

philanthropic projects, financial investments, as well as to travel to give lectures and share their expertise. An Indian respondent who had just been granted British citizenship spoke of it as being *a big deal; I had to get visas for every conference; it's a joke that I have to apply for a visa to India now*. For many who opted for the British citizenship, it was the convenience to travel rather than the desire to identify as 'being British'.

*I am Indian; to be British for me is just a convenience; if I want to travel anywhere I am free to do it; I can't understand those Indians that after 50 years in the UK are still with Indian passports; it is silly.*

For the Bosnians who had arrived during the war period there was evidence that they had formed wide transnational fields, with commitments dominated by care for elderly parents and relatives in Bosnia and elsewhere. Unlike the other respondents in the sample, their initial adaptation to life in the UK was state-organised and supported by international refugee organisations. Their primary goal after arriving was to gain the right to remain. It was a period of unintended integration, garnered with hopes for going back soon to 'what was left behind before the war' and attendance of English language classes. The war took several years. The realization that there was more permanence to their stay in the UK than initially thought of, transformed their integration experience into a more intended settlement, with varying outcomes dependent on the age of arrival in the UK, class, economic and educational backgrounds. Their frequency of home visits was also determined by the regions in Bosnia they were coming from. A young Bosnian woman born in the UK, who has been spending every summer in Bosnia since she was a baby, explained:

*A lot of Bosnians lived in the city (Prijevor) before the war but they were forced out of their homes; if these people are now in the UK they can't go back as they have nowhere to go; (Serbs) have taken their homes; they were forced to go to other places; they are also reluctant to go back as some of the people who now live in the city are those who had killed members of their family or friends.*

The younger generation who came to the UK as minors or who were born in the host country, maintain family and cultural ties with Bosnia, under the strong influence of their parents. For them, establishing connections with the mainstream society in the UK is more important than for their parents, who still anticipate returning, even if this is envisaged in retirement. Two Bosnians arrived on Australian passports (where they/their families were resettled during the war), and using the HSMP entry channel in the mid-2000s; their transnational practices, determined by a higher position on the UK labour market, go beyond the commitments to family (as there was no immediate family left in Bosnia) - participating in community projects in Bosnia; setting up businesses. Another two entered the UK on EU passports (Slovenian); their educational and economic background impacted on their absorption by the ethnic businesses in London.

More than half of the Indians in the UK sample first entered the country on student visas, followed by those on employment permits and on family visas. The UK for them is a desired destination where, according to respondents' accounts, they can acquire internationally recognised education and valuable work experience. They carry with them embodied cultural capital, in the form of British English proficiency, familiarity with the British cultural norms and even an accent, if the person comes from a wealthy family where English is spoken at home and their education was acquired in private British institutions. This is a highly transferable form of cultural capital, which is valued in the UK labour market and facilitates economic integration. Many had relatives in the UK who supported them during their initial settlement. The arrival determines a common integration trajectory for young, mainly single, Indian professionals in the UK: it starts with post-graduate studies and/or professional accreditations, followed by work in the academia or the highly remunerating financial sector. Successful economic integration leads to transnational practices of 'passive' economic nature - financial investments in commercial or residential properties; one respondent spoke of the employment of three guards and a servant for the two houses he maintains there; and, investments in fixed deposits or in high interest rate bank accounts for OCI - card holders. Philanthropic projects appear to be increasingly gaining significance amongst the migrant resources flowing into India such as that of the wealthy individual born in Kenya built a temple in his parents' village. Personal networks are used to connect Indian-Australian designers with India (they perform at events, buy fair-traded products and sell their products there); in addition, a private initiative promoted by a wealthy respondent in the sample built a school for street children while a family initiative set up a school for underprivileged children - the Indian respondent and her British husband organise charity fund-raising events in the UK to finance teachers' salaries, stationary and a meal- a- day for the pupils. The secure legal status of the Indian respondents - either dual citizenship (British citizenship and the possession of OCI -card as a proxy of Indian citizenship) or permanent residence - allows them to follow up on their investments in India, to audit the use of funds. The Indian sample revealed an example of gender-based concerns about the direction of economic capital.

A female Indian professional spoke of the significant role of traditions and customs in remitting behaviour:

*According to Indian customs, the married daughter looks after her husband's family, not her own parents. I am investing in India but the immediate beneficiaries are my husband's parents.*

Over half of the Filipino respondents arrived in the UK on employment permits, followed by those on a dependent visa. Several women in the sample arrived in London with their employers from Asian countries, holding initially an employment permit for a year, tied up to an employer. Filipino workers

bring to the UK their embodied cultural capital of English language proficiency and the acquired institutional capital of University nursing education/ or the prior experience in domestic care. Their social capital in the UK is an asset carried from the Philippines (travelling with other colleagues or or/and acquired upon arrival when they connect with associations such as Kanlungan and J3DW or join colleague in the UK. Lusia and Bauder (2009) argue that the shifting value of capital (social, economic and human) leads to segmentation in the host labour market. Most Filipino respondents in the sample are hospital nurses or domestic care workers. Kelly and Lusia (2006: 843) claim that it has become 'normal' and 'expected to find many Filipino nurses and assistants in a hospital; finding a Filipino doctor or surgeon would be anomalous. 'A gendered Filipino-ness' can be an asset across transnational space, but it can also hamper social mobility. The multiple entry points used to recruit Filipino respondents led to identifying interviewees in other sectors of the labour market. They included an academic, an activist-researcher and an activist-trade unionist, a social worker and an IT consultant-entrepreneur. Their integration strategies - in terms of economic capital (position in the labour market) and social capital (derived from beyond the ethnic community and/or within it) determine to a degree their transnational practices. The activists transfer ideas and funds to community organisations at home; the academic is engaged in publishing philosophical ideas; the majority of them invest in residential properties or farm land - more often to support family members in need than for business returns. A distinct feature of their return visits is the excessive spending and the many gifts bought from the UK to meet the expectations of children left behind, parents, siblings, relatives and friends. They would need to live quite frugally when back in the UK to make up for it:

*We take all the family on holidays and pay for them; this is what it is expected; we cannot go against these traditions.*

A mother spoke of the shock her children experienced when they were reunited with her in the UK:

*They had to sleep in one room with me, in my employers' house. They could not believe it as they had no idea of the conditions I was living in the UK. I would regularly send them money and expensive brands of clothes and gadgets.*

Less than half of the Ukrainian respondents in the sample entered the UK on student visas, followed by an equal share of those who came on a dependent visa and on employment permit. Most have mastered the embodied cultural capital of English language while attending MBA or other post-graduate programmes in the UK; a couple acquired it while attending English classes upon arrival. Most arrived in the early 2000s when the post -studies employment visa was an available option to settle in the country. A young family with a child came through the HSMP route. Most of the Ukrainian respondents were classified as

Managers/Technical professionals; the remaining were academics. Their successful professional integration in the host country is contingent on transnational activities related to property investments and a failed 'active' investment in business.

Family support and assistance during the travel between the UK and the origin country is an important facilitator of transnational mobility.

Mazzucato (2011) defines the term reverse remittances as the flows of capital from home communities to migrants. Parents have financed the studies of many Indian and Ukrainian respondents during the years they were post-graduate students in the UK, including support with travel to visit home during the holidays. Once the children are in work in the UK, and that work is matching their qualifications, family support is restricted to home visits. Cultural specificities define different modalities of family support. The experiences of Filipino and Indian respondents are at the opposite ends of the spectrum. Filipino migrants would drain their resources to provide financially for family when back home. In return they would get valuable family time of cooking, eating and partying together as well as help with child care. It is cultural, they explain. Conversely, most Indians, in their late 20s to middle 30s, spoke of their families (parents) covering everything during home visits.

*I do spend money there but generally I do not need to worry about anything.  
It is the culture we belong to: accommodation, food, driving me around.*

The interviews revealed different forms of family support that facilitate migrants' travelling back home. These include childcare, looking after properties and helping with investments; the provision of accommodation and lifts during visits.

An Indian female academic in her mid-30s felt tremendous gratitude for the support of her parents in her transnational engagement with India:

*My parents help me massively; I would not be able to do it without them. I do not need a hotel when I go there; they pick me up from the airport; I don't have to think of money conversion; even clothes I keep there; these are clothes particular for there – culturally determined to visit government offices; I can't be in trousers. Basically, I don't have to plan the trip.*

Many returnees and interviewees in the UK spoke of the significant emotional support provided by parents and family. A Bosnian woman was very proud with her mother's involvement in her transnational projects: *My mum provides accommodation when I go back but she is also the master-mind of all my projects.*

The ongoing conflict in the Ukraine appears to be a significant impediment on the frequency and duration of travel to the region, particularly of respondents from eastern Ukraine (the war zone). A couple of

respondents from Donetsk shared increasing concerns about their property investments, which had been abandoned as people were losing their jobs and not being able to pay rents/bills. Ten days before the interview, a missile destroyed the family home of one of the respondents; she had to relocate her parents to the capital Kiev. Those with children stopped travelling to the area. Other respondents talked about shorter durations of stay there as, *it has turned into such a sad place; people talk only about the war; it does not matter where in the country you are, East or West, you are massively affected; families and friends are divided.*

What is happening in the home country affects the integration in the host area, through the social connection element of Ager and Strang's integration model. Social links are fractured, social bonds are loosened.

The war in the former Yugoslavia dates back over 20 years. Nonetheless, interviewees revealed an overarching impact on their physical mobility and their levels of engagement in the area. Older people who remember having lived in Bosnia are more likely to anticipate eventual return; they travel more often and stay longer. For them learning English and forging ties with the mainstream society here may be not as important as they are for their children born in the UK. Some suggested deliberate segregation whereby people sell properties in their previous places of residence to relocate to places with concentration of Muslims /Serbs respectively. The struggling economy of Ukraine - months of turmoil have taken their toll - discourages investment and business activities, significantly affecting any transnational behaviour.

Others commented on Bosnia as a difficult place for investment - following the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement, the increased administration in the country has caused economic stagnation (a lot of administrative fees are collected; low cost carriers do not travel there; very lengthy and expensive procedures for opening up a business; very high social insurance contributions, illegal employment and burgeoning informal 'grey' economy. One of the respondents attempted to produce his clothing designs in Bosnia but because of costly production and shipping, he went to Bulgaria.

*To grow my business, it is difficult to be more involved in Bosnia. I would not find a small, reliable factory there to produce my designs. It is not EU, which makes it expensive for shipping.*

Some respondents talked about the economic opportunities in India as phenomenal.

*It is a 1.2 billion market; it is tremendous if you can catch 1% of that market; 50-60% of the population is under 25 - huge vibrancy, people have entrepreneur spirit, great work ethic and desire to succeed, which, sadly, in the UK got stagnant. It so easy to lose focus here and start taking things for granted.*

The Filipino respondents expressed concerns about corruption in government and economic and, political instability as the main push factors for emigration. The same reasons were stated for their reluctant engagement with the home country, beyond the outright purchase of a house or land.

**Table 6: Summary of facilitators of and impediments to economic transnationalism**

<b>Facilitators of economic transnational mobility</b>	<b>Impediments to economic transnational mobility</b>
Stable political situation at home; rule of law Lack of conflict	Political instability, corruption Ongoing conflict (Ukraine) Past conflict (Bosnia)
Buoyant economy at home/host country	Stagnant economy at home/host country
Reverse remittances/ Family support	Lack of home community support
Settlement/Citizenship/Legal Status/ Integration	Insecure legal status in the host country/ employment in the underground/ethnic economy
Existence of family/ friends at home	Lack of family/friends at home
Strong sense of belonging/attachment to the home country	Disinterest in/weak sense of belonging to home country

Almost all transnational activities were individual or family-driven, while only a few were work or business related (Table 5). None of these were part of a state bilateral agreement or programme, illustrating the growing significance of the 'transnationalism from below' phenomenon (Guarnizo and Smith, 1998). There is a fraction of work-required and business trips; other travel is for the experiences of culture; transnational activism has motivated trips to Bosnia and Ukraine. Visits to family and attending family events are combined with giving lectures at former academic institutions, sharing expertise, following up on philanthropic activities [the reasons for mobility have informed our typologies of transnationalism, discussed in an earlier section of this report].

All returnees had immediate family members in the origin country - the very foundation of their decision to resettle. Nine respondents in the UK sample had no immediate family at home - four in Bosnia (families dispersed during the war and remained in the settlement country); three in India (families already in the UK; one respondent's parents had moved to Saudi Arabia after retirement); one in Ukraine and one in the Philippines (family in the UK and elsewhere).

'Transnationalism and identity are concepts that inherently call for juxtaposition', wrote Steven Vertovec in 2001, in a themed issue of JEMS. He explained it with the formation of transnational networks based upon perceptions of shared identities of place of origin and, common cultural and linguistic traits. The

transnational activism of the Filipinos in London collecting donations in support of typhoon victims; the Bosnians raising money and clothes for the people left homeless by the apocalyptic floods and the Ukrainians driving all the way to Maidan (Kiev’s independence square) to take medicines, warm blankets and money to soldiers and civilians, are poignant illustrations of that.

**Table 7: Reasons for transnational mobility**

<b>Reasons for transnational mobility</b>	<b>UK sample</b>	<b>Returnees</b>
<b>Visiting family</b>	77 (95.1%)	16 (88.9%)
<b>Taking care of property/other economic issues</b>	46 (56.8%)	5 (27.8%)
<b>Finding a job</b>	1 (1.2%)	3 (16.7%)
<b>Adapting to the country</b>	2 (2.5%)	3 (16.7%)
<b>Sorting out bureaucratic issues</b>	9 (11.1%)	1 (5.6%)

*Source:* UK Field Survey; surveys of returnees in India and Ukraine

It is only the Bosnian collective and individual identity that struggles to fit Vertovec's parameters. Questions to the Bosnian respondents about homeland belonging and identity were met with visible unease. The majority of Bosnians who were resettled in the UK during the Yugoslav war<sup>19</sup> were Muslims; there were also some Serbs, Croats and some of mixed background. There was little history in Bosnia of Muslims organising collectively or mobilising along ethnic lines (Bennett, 1995, cited in Kelly, 2003). There was no clearly defined Muslim identity and the lives of Muslims, Serbs and Croats were interlinked at every level of social existence, including in mixed marriages. It was an identity made in a multireligious and multi-ethnic coexistence (of Orthodox Serbs, Catholic Croats and Muslim Bosnians). The ethnicised nature of the conflict in Bosnia, the horrific violence executed along 'putative ethnic lines', the ensuing physical displacement and the experiences at concentration camps, the psychological separations (Kelly, 2003) inadvertently changed the individual and collective perceptions of what being Bosnian was. The

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<sup>19</sup> Following the break-up of Yugoslavia, and the unprecedented rise in refugee numbers since the the WWII, the UK government, under UNHCR pressures, agreed to accept a quota of refugee. A programme - known as the Bosnian project - was established for their entry into Britain, with the status of temporary protection (Kelly, 2003).

lands of today's Bosnia and Herzegovina were forcefully divided by the 1995 Dayton Agreement into two entities: a federation of Muslims (known as Bosniaks) and Croats, and a Serb Republic.

*I can't identify with these new republics. I have my best memories of the former Yugoslavia but I don't want to relate to the war project,* mentioned a Bosnian-Serb in late 40s, who has never been back to the origin place in today's divided Bosnia-Herzegovina. He only goes to visit family in the part that is Republic of Serbia. *I am very Bosnian but my identity is stuck in the early 1990s when I left Bosnia,* said a Bosnian-Muslim woman in mid-40s, eluding the lost pre-war identity.

*For a long time I used to carry the Yugoslav identity. I am very disappointed with the break-up of Yugoslavia. After the war, I feel passionate about being Bosnian (Muslim) - it is the survival instinct to fight off people who had pushed you out,*

lamented a Bosnian man, who was in last year of college when the Bosnian war broke out and the family emigrated to Australia. The conflict acts as a catalyst to re-create ethnic identities and belonging along religious, ethnic lines. Similarly, the ongoing conflict in Ukraine has altered peoples' sense of belonging to the country. For many, before the conflict, their Ukrainian identity was loose, ephemeral, largely diluted within the Russian language and culture. *It was not important.* Since the start of the conflict, they felt the urgency to come out in the world as Ukrainians, to emphasise the importance of being Ukrainian albeit with Russian surnames and language. For others, the conflict put an end to their being 'here' and 'there'. *Before the conflict I felt divided. My home was in Kiev and I had a home in London; I now feel firmly grounded in London,* mentioned an Ukrainian female professional who had left country as part of a company transfer.

The home country/region offers the most genuine environment for re-living and enacting the sense of belonging and identity. These were tested with the returnees' experiences of life in India. Although there was a sense of belonging, it took a while for a couple to settle back in India. The female respondent felt that she was much more independent abroad where basic necessities were taken care of such as infrastructure, electricity, water, which is a problem in India. *Subsequently, one gets used to and works around the givens.* The attachments to the homeland are transformed into regional adaptations. Another returnee in India spoke of difficulties of adjusting to cultural differences when moving from her home town of Pune to Delhi. Different measures are applied to home country belonging when it is about resettling in the country to start a business or take up paid employment. One discerns a great degree of frustration in the words of a male respondent-returnee in India:

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*Firstly, India is quite rowdy now. The biggest issue is the way people handle business here, they are not very professional. I still have interaction issues with professional behaviour of people I meet. Civic culture of Delhi is rowdy, chaotic and impatient. You could be killed here trying to cross the road.*

Interviewees spoke of different work practices and ethics in the UK and India. They claimed that the value of cultural capital acquired abroad was distorted by misunderstandings of 'dignity of labour', 'bad office politics', and nepotism. Other challenges for adaptation to home included pollution, traffic, bureaucracy and corruption, as well as the concomitant, conflicting emotions of longing to be close to family while desiring to be independent:

*In terms of cultural and personal life, I long for the freedom I had in the UK including opportunities of independent music making. However, in the UK one does feel like an outsider at times. Back in India, I do feel like I belong here but the identity has gotten a bit confused,*

shared a male returnee-photographer. Such accounts reveal the complexities pertaining to Sassen's (1998) 'portability of national identity'.

Many Filipino and Indian respondents in the UK spoke of the evolving nature of their sense of attachment to home (parents' home in the case of second-generation), reshaped during different stages in their personal life and underscored by political and macroeconomic developments. Young people spoke of strong attachment to India during their childhood, which gradually faded away in their adulthood. Older respondents had shared feelings of negativity towards the recent changes at home brought about by neo-liberal politics, destructive forces of globalisation, and populist, right-wing culture. A Filipino man in his late 30s gasped:

*I am appalled by what capitalist globalisation has turned my country into; there are giant casinos for the wealthy foreigners and poverty, low wages for the locals.*

The feelings of belonging to India by the UK respondents were sometimes localised, channelled into a particular state and community.

*I have a strong sense of belonging to my state, my community. Where I come from is very different from the rest of the country in terms of language, religion, dressing up; ethnically, we are very different => historically and nowadays, there is a lot of discrimination against us there. It is difficult for me to identify myself as Indian & belonging to India. I feel very strong about that.*

This was the account of an Indian female academic, actively involved in supporting charities in her origin place.

The Filipino respondents referred to state corruption as the destructive force in their practices of engagement with home and the main 'push' factor for the mass emigration from the country.

A common theme in the narratives of all respondents across all groups in the sample was the sense of home country belonging operating in a cycle - when they had just left their origin countries, there was certainty they would go back one day; then they met many new friends from across the globe in the UK and started looking at the home country as a third person, someone who is in-between here and there; they were not sure they would go back anymore; then they made Indian friends as well, started celebrating cultural events and it all brought back the desire to return home one day. *It goes backward and forward this sense of belonging. People make me belong*, was often reiterated.

#### ***4.2 Link between integration and transnational mobility***

Correlation analysis was cautiously employed to gauge the existence and directions of relationships between transnational mobility and integration indicators, accounting for the small sample size and its purposive nature. It is also acknowledged that the relationship between integration and transnationalism varies continuously throughout the life course and the migration trajectory, against changing personal circumstances as well as under changing macroeconomic and political conditions, both at the origin and in the destination. Linearity is only assumed for the purpose of statistical analysis.

No significant relationships were identified between the frequency of transnational mobility and the number of children in the origin country, a partner in the origin country and a partner from the same ethnic origin, while there was a clear positive association between transnational mobility and two measures of economic integration in the UK namely, the respondents' current job in managerial/technical professions and the respondents' job requiring travel (Table 8)<sup>20</sup>.

Measured in terms of one of Ager and Strang 'makers and means' indicator of integration - housing - the Filipinos in the sample score the highest, with over half owning a residential property in the UK, followed by half of the Ukrainians, less than half of the Indians and only a quarter of the Bosnians. Many of them still live in the public housing offered to them when they arrived as asylum seekers in the 1990s.

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<sup>20</sup> The associations were estimated using Pearson's r correlation coefficient (scale variable vs. dichotomous variable).

**Table 8: Relationships between frequency of travel and integration indicators**

<b>Integration indicators</b>	<b>Frequent travel (number of times visiting in the past two years)</b>
<b>Current job in managerial/ technical profession</b>	0.323***
<b>Job requiring travel</b>	0.307***

Note: \*\*\* - significance at 0.01

Property investment in the UK was positively associated with education in the host country, investment in the origin country, having a partner from the same ethnic origin, receiving support by family during travel to the origin and dual citizenship. The latter variable is both a 'foundation' and a 'facilitator' of integration in the conceptual framework of Ager and Strand while the family support in the origin contributes to the 'social bridges'. There is a positive association between setting up a business in the UK and being in a managerial/technical specialist position (Table 9).

**Table 9: Relationships between property investment/setting up business in the UK and other integration and attachment to origin indicators**

<b>Integration indicators</b>	<b>Attachment to origin</b>	<b>Property investment in UK</b>	<b>Setting up business in UK</b>
Education in the UK		4.204**	
	Investment in the origin country	3.632*	
	Having a partner from the same ethnic origin	9.852***	
	Receiving family support	4.122**	
Dual citizenship		4.305**	
Being in managerial/ technical specialist position in UK			4.954**

Note: \*\*\* - significance at 0.01; \*\* - significance at 0.05; \* - significance at 0.1

Chi-squared test is applying for testing the existence of relationships between categorical, non-ranked variables. All phi-coefficients have positive signs.

Property investment in the origin country was correlated with successful economic integration in the UK. Investing in property in the home country was positively associated with current job in the UK being a manager/technical professional and being on a permanent contract (Table 10).

**Table 10: Relationship between property investment in the origin and some integration indicators**

<b>Integration indicators</b>	<b>Property investment at origin</b>
Managerial/technical specialist job in UK	11.040***
Being on permanent contract in UK	4.510**

Note: \*\*\* - significance at 0.01; \*\* - significance at 0.05; \* - significance at 0.1

Chi-squared test is applying for testing the existence of relationships between categorical, non-ranked variables. The two phi-coefficients have positive signs.

Having social protection at home (contributing to social insurance) was negatively associated with membership in an association in the UK<sup>21</sup> and positively with feelings with of being in the UK temporary<sup>22</sup>. Remitting money home was positively related with being on a permanent contract in the UK, being a trade union member and feelings of the UK as a second home (Table 11).

**Table 11: Relationship between remitting and some integration indicators**

<b>Integration indicators</b>	<b>Remitting money home</b>
Being on a permanent contract in UK	2.828*
Trade union members in UK	2.872*
Felt the UK was their second home	3.403*

Note: \* - significance at 0.1

Chi-squared test is applying for testing the existence of relationships between categorical, non-ranked variables. All three phi-coefficients have positive signs.

<sup>21</sup>  $\chi^2=11.059$ ,  $df=1$ ,  $p<1\%$

<sup>22</sup>  $\chi^2=4.625$ ,  $df=1$ ,  $p<1\%$

The feelings of temporariness in the UK were more likely to be associated with the respondents' perception of the origin country as a good business environment; with no association membership in the UK, no business associates or employers in the UK, and no business investment in the UK (Table 10).

**Table 12: Relationship between feelings of temporariness in the UK and integration/home attachment indicators**

Integration/home attachment indicators	Feelings of temporariness in the UK
Origin country is a good business environment	4.625** (phi=0.239)
No association membership in UK	9.253*** (phi=-0.338)
No business associates/employers in UK	8.708*** (phi=-0.328)
No business investment in UK	3.468* (phi=-0.207)

Note: \*\*\* - significance at 0.01; \*\* - significance at 0.05; \* - significance at 0.1

Chi-squared test is applying for testing the existence of relationships between categorical, non-ranked variables.

**Table 13: Summary of qualitative findings on the relationship between transnational mobility and integration**

Mobile transnationalists		
Integration in the UK	High Economic and Social Integration	Moderate Transnational Mobility (1-2 times per year)
<b>Mobile Family Transnationalist</b>	* Indian businessman building pilgrimage in father's village *Indian young financialists investing in properties for rent, joint projects with parents/family there	* Taking care of own properties; renting them out. Often, the property will offer (free or at symbolic price) accommodation to family or other relatives in need. A Filipino woman spoke of her recent purchase of a flat in Manila to house her sister, a single mother of four. *Filipino man investing in property back home to retire there ( <i>I would not want to end up in a nursing home in UK</i> )
<b>Mobile Economic Transnationalist</b>	* <u>A couple of returnees to India:</u> a) Owns a marketing consultancy company, specializing in market research, marketing analytics and digital marketing; the company serves clients not only in India but also in overseas markets. b) Musical entrepreneur who travels the world for gigs. * <u>Respondents with jobs requiring travel:</u>	* <u>Respondents with businesses requiring travel:</u> a) Resource mobiliser: Ethnic shop owner travelling to supply goods for the shop in London=> family, ethnic shop; social contacts within the ethnic community; reside in social housing b) Ukrainian exhibition business manager - still 'home' sick; came to the

- a) 11 UK-returnees in India (academics, business consultants, musicians)
- b) 7 Indian academic researchers; one banker - considered themselves cosmopolitan as well as socially integrated in UK, employed at the high end of the market
- c) Ukrainian investment banker
- \* One respondent used to do business importing electronic components to India but had to stop because of old age; came very young to UK, was educated here, married English.
  - \* Another respondent had a tea importing business in Ukraine (with rented property and employees there); corruption at the Ukraine-Polish border in mid-2000s forced her to close the enterprise.
  - \* Investing in agricultural land in the Philippines and in India as an asset that is difficult to depreciate (30% and 6% of respondents, respectively); the returns may be insignificant but often, the farm land provides family and relatives with livelihood. Filipinos with British citizenship only and no dual nationality, and Overseas Citizens of India cannot make this investment.
  - \* An Indian woman who travels to her village in the Shilong region to get leather and other materials - all certified by the government and fair-traded - for the design hand bags she makes in the UK; they are sold online or to local boutiques. *I want people to wear these materials every day, not on special occasions only. It's a way for people in the West to learn about my village.*

UK to marry; feel painful nostalgia for home country; on temporary contract but feels confident will have work; social support - sister's family in UK.

c) a beautician who gets oils and henna for her salon in Brighton when visiting family in India. She was a well-known beautician before coming to the UK. Women from her village would still ask her to thread their eyebrows while she is back.

*It is not for the money I am doing it (it is so little anyway); I am doing it to maintain and revive my ties with the local community, for them to remember me. She has a moderately successful business in the UK while social life is limited to family and the community.*

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<p><b>Mobile</b></p> <p><b>Civic/Political/Academic</b></p> <p><b>Transnationalist</b></p>	<p>*A Filipino academic in UK reported engagement in publishing activities for a Philosophy magazine every time she is back; the income covers her stay there; activist in Filipino community &amp; with friend among different groups through University, where she is teaching/PhD research.</p> <p>*Bosnian-born civil servant in UK, with no family in BiH but often visits as nostalgic for culture &amp; music; he also mobilizes resources for home country reforms &amp; relief from natural disasters/ financial crisis (supports monthly food shopping for disadvantaged families; financially contributed to building a house for an elderly couple).</p>	<p>*PhD researcher, Bosnian-born, mobilises resources for relief of suffering as a result of floods/financial hardship; can be classified as homeland reformer.</p>
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## 5. In focus: Profiles of Transnationally Mobile Migrants

### *Case 1: Fractured economic transnationalism: between United Kingdom and the Ukraine*

Jenia is a married mother of one in her early 40s and a high level financial professional. Jenia has been residing in the UK for 13 years. She had worked in the capital of Kiev for a decade as a management consultant for an international company but she knew that it could be better if she did a post-graduate degree in business abroad. She came to London to study for a MSc in Business Administration in one of the best Business Schools in the world. Her father had helped substantially, giving her all his savings but she also borrowed money from a bank. She managed to find employment immediately after graduation which was crucial for her future business success. She settled in the UK when the immigration rules were straightforward, favouring high skilled migration.

Jenia was born in the East of Ukraine, the epicentre of the current military conflict in the country. Her parents lived there until last September when a missile destroyed the house. They were not at home at the time. She is consequently buying a house for them in the secure Kiev region. The conflict has also damaged her investment, which she bought outright with her own savings. The flat she had bought to rent out to supplement her parents' income has been empty for over a year. There is no demand as people have lost their incomes and cannot afford to rent. Before the birth of her child, she would travel to the Ukraine for work at least twice a month for four days to a week at a time. She was working there with independent companies and the government. Starting a family was a new chapter in her busy professional/ transnational life. Before, when she was between relationships, she felt belonging nowhere. She was most comfortable on the plane but then she realised that she was not getting the best from anywhere. She decided that London was her home. She now travels to Ukraine twice a year accompanied by her young daughter and husband. She goes back because of her parents and a sibling. Her friends are mainly in London. *"If I had no family there, I would probably go only once in 3-4 years"*. If she needed medical help in the Ukraine, she would be entitled to free health care using the internal passport of her parents.

Coming to the UK, and London in particular, has completely changed Jenia's life. While she had never been abroad before, she has travelled the world since coming to the UK. *I feel culturally enriched living in the most wonderful city, London, in a democratic country. The disadvantage is that I am away from my ageing parents. I would want to be closer to them.* She is now a British citizen and has invested in buying a flat in the UK. After her maternity leave, her professional networks helped her find a position in the company that required less travel. She does not feel that she misses Ukrainian culture very much but she does feel more Ukrainian since the war. She has a Russian surname but emphasizes that she is Ukrainian.

### ***Case 2: Socio-cultural transnationalism and economic activism: between United Kingdom and Bosnia-Herzegovina***

Demir is a single man of Bosnian origin, in his 30s and runs a school. He was head-hunted for the job.

Demir was still in high school when the war broke out. In the spring of 1992, the family was resettled in Australia where he completed high school and went to University, graduating in business studies. He spoke no English when he first went to Australia, at the age of 14. A project manager in construction, he decided to emigrate to the UK, on Tier 4: temporary work scheme (Commonwealth Programme). *I always wanted to come back to Europe, in an English speaking country.* Demir has a dual Bosnian-Australian citizenship.

He is a frequent traveller to Bosnia. In the last two years, he visited 10-15 times, staying from two weeks to a month at a time. *I am nostalgic for the culture, the music, my friends. I only have distant family there. Apart from that, Bosnia does not suit my way of thinking. I prefer to live in a modern society. I need to live in the Western world. I don't like how they process the world there.* Demir goes to his new residence in the capital Sarajevo, where he bought a house with own savings. He faced many difficulties with the investment: bureaucracy, corruption and lack of market. *Bureaucracy is a standard item in Bosnia; everything happens through who you know, not what you know.*

Recently he arranged the work placement of two Bosnian people in London to develop their knowledge and experience in special needs education, and return afterwards. He has been involved in fund-raising for projects in Bosnia. Two years ago he helped build a house for an elderly couple. Last year he collected money for the floods in the UK and then drove to the destination where there was need.

When asked about state programmes for engaging the Diaspora for home country development, he commented: *It will be a long time before we see anything like this. Corruption is on a very high level. Politicians see the Diaspora as a direct threat to their security. Politicians won't allow things to be done differently.*

On the question of belonging to the origin country he said that for a long time he felt strongly about the Yugoslav identity and he was very disappointed with the break-up of Yugoslavia. *After the war I say I am passionate to be Bosnian. It is the survival instinct to fight off the people who pushed you out.*

He has no family or relatives in the UK but he has lots of friends and business associates. He regularly attends Bosnian music events in London. *I gained a life in London, a life style and cultural experience I always wanted. What I lost was closeness with family.* He plans to make a home in the UK and continue to travel to Bosnia to stay engaged with life and culture there.

### ***Case 3: Socio-academic transnationalism: between United Kingdom and India***

Suprija is a single mother of one, an academic in her 30s. She came to the UK 12 years ago, on a scholarship, to study for her Master's degree; she then continued to a PhD. Her work requires frequent travel to India where she goes for fieldwork. In the past two years, she went there 8-10 times; she stays on average for two to three

weeks. Sometimes she would go for six weeks, putting her daughter in a nursery there. *She has her routine. She has a life in the UK and in India.* Suprija travels a lot in rural areas looking at social policy issues and gender dynamics. She always combines her research visits with spending time with her parents and her brother's family. Her young daughter always travels with her. *If I were to travel just to see my family, it would be once a year.*

For her, it is paramount to be able to go to India and come back. *I would not be able to live in the UK. It reorganises me to go back home. It is like a drug. I need my fix. The longest I have been here was 9 months and it was impossible to live with. My heart is in India. I hang out with friends; it is the people I go back to. It's the place, the food, the weather, the culture; it's the feeling one can't explain-just being myself.*

Her parents are a great support to her. They travel to the UK to help her with her daughter. Before coming to the UK, she worked for an international NGO in Jaipur with a long-term contract. Both parents had businesses. And she was in a very good financial situation.

She would return to India if she could have the same job there. Asked about the advantages of immigrating to the UK, she replies that these are not economic as she would have done better if she had stayed in India. The benefits for her are only social - *the system, which works and is not so bureaucratic, the roads, the infrastructure are better.* For her, the greatest disadvantage is her daughter not learning much Hindi and missing the culture. *I am so far away from my family. At minimum I need 12 hours to reach them, which is very scary.* She misses the Indian culture. During the biggest Indian festival, she is always at work. *This does not make me feel like home.*

She has invested in a house in the UK. Ideally, she would like to go back to India but recognises that it is becoming impossible as the father of her daughter is in the UK. *Mainly, I want to be settled. Travelling is taking its toll on me.*

#### **Case 4: Socio-economic transnationalism: between United Kingdom and the Philippines**

Lapus is 40 years old, a married father of two young children and a qualified hospital nurse.

He holds a mechanical engineering degree from a University in Manila. Before coming to the UK in 2002, he had worked on ships under foreign flags. It was a work injury that brought him to the UK where his partner was already working in a hospital. When he recovered, he decided to end his seafaring, marry his long-term partner and start a family in Brighton, UK. He has a brother who is living in Brighton and a sister in London (another sibling is in the Philippines and four are in the USA). He had to re-qualify and trained as a nurse at the local University. Lapus speaks English, Tagalog and the main South dialect in the Philippines. He is proficient in English as he went to a school where English textbooks were used and English subjects were taught together with Filipino subjects. He also used English as the working language on the foreign ships.

Lapus and his family travelled once to the Philippines in the past two years and stayed for a month. They can afford to go there only once in three years. *Hospitals' annual leave is eight weeks. It is cheaper to go to*

*America and Europe than the Philippines. It is expensive during the school holiday when prices are double. He (with his family) goes back to see his father and his other brother's family, for leisure or to work on the house they have built. They mainly stay in his brother's house in Manila but also go for a week to other places to show to his children. The house is on a piece of land in the South province, near a market. People want to rent it. One of these days he will decide to rent it out. Commercial land is a good investment, it does not depreciate. It was bought with his own money but he also inherited farm land from his parents, which is far from the town. When he was young, he was helping on the farm; they were growing bananas, mangos, and wild trees. His brother who stayed in the Philippines inherited the business of selling bananas in containers into Manila. He has the best life of all the six of us who went abroad. He has no college degree but is a very successful businessman - he also owns a construction business in the province and a taxi business in Manila.*

For Lapus, the disadvantages of going back there are the hot weather and the spending of money. *If you go to a resort with relatives, you have to pay for all of them. If it is Christmas, we have to send them gifts. We are sending money to more than 10 people there. We are not obliged to help but we want to make them happy so we help.*

Lapus sends money every month into a government insurance scheme on health & pension. He can get a lump sum or monthly payments after his 60th birthday. He feels like a local in Brighton like being in Manila. He has a lot of friends through the Brighton and Hove Filipino Community. He was the association's sports officer. Lapus spoke of some experiences of discrimination. *The fact you were not born here, you look different. Hospitals are very multicultural but still, there is prejudice; we are foreigners; can't avoid it. There is a BME group, looking after those workers; nobody looks after us; we look after ourselves.* He is thinking of going back to the Philippines to retire, *rather than being in a nursing home in the UK. It is better to be there, with your people, to choose who to help you.*

## **6. Concluding remarks**

Over a decade ago, at the outset of renewed research interest in migrant transnationalism, Steven Vertovec (2001: 576) suggested that instead of applying a single theory of transnationalism and migration, researchers would do better to 'theorise typologies of transnationalisms and the conditions that affect them'. This report does exactly that. It examines the simultaneous processes of migrant integration, transnational mobility and capital transfers through the prism of different typologies of transnationalism, modified and re-shaped by changing family structures, migration rules, economic and political developments, in the origin and at the destination. The study utilises a wealth of data from Bosnian-Herzegovinian, Ukrainian, Indian and Filipino migrants in the UK, returnees in India and Ukraine, and stakeholders.

The voice of the migrant second-generation is captured in three interviews while the strong influence of family and cultural traditions have created their transnational space between the UK and the origin country of their parents. It is difficult to predict if the transnational ties will be maintained once the parents are not there to exercise their influence.

The study showed that transnationalism could exist without physical travel to the origin. Undocumented status prevented transnational mobility but the strong engagement was maintained unscathed through the regular sending of goods and money, donating to hospitals, and everyday talking to family members on the phone and social media. Similarly, on a few occasions, transnational activism was practiced without physical travel. The new modes of communication allow migrants to maintain their home-based relations and interests.

There were examples of engagement in different modes of transnational mobility at different stages of respondents' lives. The demanding profile of transnational entrepreneurs was only identified in eight interviewees, Indian and Bosnian. There were transnational activists among the Filipinos, Bosnians and the Ukrainians. Philanthropic activities were registered towards all origin countries in the study, with the largest share of resources flowing to India. Academic transnationalism was often combined with family visits. The representatives of the 'transnational business class' were business graduates, sometimes headhunted and working in the City of London. The time of arrival in the UK was paramount for their successful economic integration and transnational activities. They seem to be more cosmopolitan than transnational, with limited socio-cultural integration in the host environment. The latter loses significance against their dynamically changing work prospects, subject to migration and family status. Overall, there was a broad participation in socio-cultural activities across all studied groups, while economic activities had few participants.

Physical mobility made transnational engagement much more feasible. Obtaining British citizenship or a permanent status was an important goal of most migration projects. The freedom of movement is likely to outweigh the 'British-ness' objective.

The integration of Indians and Filipinos in the UK was facilitated by English language proficiency on arrival and India-born in particular had the highly transferable cultural capital. For Filipinos, the social capital was an asset carried from the Philippines or acquired upon arrival through connections with ethnic associations. Filipino workers were identified in several sectors of the economy defying to a degree Kelly's and Lusi's (2006) 'gendered Filipino-ness', which, they argued, can be an asset but also an impediment to their social mobility. More Ukrainians had benefited from the HSMP route of arrival in the UK in the early 2000s. Time of arrival in the UK was an important predictor for one's challenges upon arrival in the UK, including obtaining permanent legalisation status, naturalisation, access to housing and employment. The recent years in the UK have been characterised by increasingly restrictive migration rules. As a result, several respondents in high skilled jobs considered moving to countries like the USA and Canada, where they expected more favourable migration policies.

Frequent travel was related to shorter durations of stay back home. A short annual leave and an anxiety to distribute the time between the home country and elsewhere as well as children at school were all intervening factors. Geographical distance partly explains the frequency of travel and the duration of stay there. It is also an indication of the available means of travel. Bosnian respondents were the most frequent travellers and the only ones that travelled to Bosnia by car, with the whole family, in the summer.

Almost all transnational activities were an illustration of the 'transnationalism from below', which is practiced outside any state bilateral agreements or programmes.

The nature of transnationalism and the frequency of travel evolves in conditions of military conflict - the current one in Ukraine and the past conflict, with spill-over effects through more than 20 years, in Bosnia and Herzegovina - shifting political circumstances, migration rules and macroeconomic conditions. Family support during travels between the UK and the origin countries was an important facilitator of transnational mobility. Reverse remittances were registered from parents in the origin who were supporting their children's' post-graduate studies in the UK. The pattern was most persistent among Indian respondents. The subsequent successful economic integration in the UK leads to transnational practices of a passive economic nature in the form of investment in commercial or residential properties, and financial investments.

The report argues that stable political situations in the home country and lack of conflict are the foundations of transnational mobility. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine appeared to be a significant

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impediment on the transnational practices in the east of the country (the war zone). The months of turmoil have taken their toll on the country; its struggling economy discourages investment and business activities. Similarly, the war in the former Yugoslavia dating back over 20 years still mars the transnational engagements in the area. A recent report by Sarajevo University professors of political science<sup>23</sup> discusses the deteriorating economic conditions in the country following the 1995 peace agreement, with a 63% youth unemployment rate, and a society, which is 'gradually losing the ability to manage itself'. The Filipino respondents spoke of corruption, political and economic instability, as the main factors perpetuating emigration and hindering transnationalism. Conversely, mobility is facilitated by the existence of family and friends in the home country; their assistance is vital for maintaining transnational practices. Having hinted at the facilitators and impediments to economic transnational mobility, the challenge remains to develop a holistic framework for understanding migrant transnationalism, devoid of - as much as it is feasible - methodological nationalism.

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<sup>23</sup> Julian Borger, 'Islamic State exploits dire situation in Bosnia to lure recruits', *The Guardian*, 26 June 2015.

## Annex I: Interviews' List UK


<b>Id</b>	<b>Int. code</b>	<b>Interviewer</b>	<b>Place - 1</b>	<b>Place - 2</b>	<b>Method</b>	<b>Language</b>	<b>EU CoD</b>	<b>Ret</b>	<b>CoO</b>	<b>Sex</b>	<b>Age</b>
1	UK-IN-1-2	Eugenia	East London	Cafes/restaurant	Notes	English	UK	No	IND	M	19-29
2	IN-2-1	Geetika	New Delhi	Workplace	Notes	English	UK	Yes	IND	F	19-29
3	IN-2-2	Geetika	Bangalore	Phone	Notes	English	UK	Yes	IND	F	30-49
13	UK-PHI-2-4	Eugenia	North London	Associations/consulate	Notes	English	UK	No	PHI	F	30-49
17	UK-IN-2-5	Eugenia	East London	Cafes/restaurant	Notes	English	UK	No	IND	F	30-49
19	UK-UA-2-7	Eugenia	East London	Cafes/restaurant	Notes	English	UK	No	UKR	F	40-49
20	UK-PHI-2-8	Eugenia	West London	Associations/consulate	Notes	English	UK	No	PHI	F	40-49
22	UK-PHI-2-10	Eugenia	West London	Cafes/restaurant	Notes	English	UK	No	PHI	F	50+
24	UK-PHI-1-11	Eugenia	South Bank, London	Cafes/restaurant	Notes	English	UK	No	PHI	M	30-49
25	UK-UA-1-12	Eugenia	Waterloo station, London	Cafes/restaurant	Notes	English	UK	No	UKR	M	19-29
28	UK-BiH-2-13	Eugenia	Brighton	Cafes/restaurant	Notes	English	UK	No	BIH	F	40-49
30	UK-IN-2-14	Eugenia	Brighton	Cafes/restaurant	Notes	English	UK	No	IND	F	30-49
36	UK-IN-2-15	Eugenia	Brighton	Home	Notes	English	UK	No	IND	F	50+
37	UK-PHI-2-16	Eugenia	West London	Cafes/restaurant	Notes	English	UK	No	PHI	F	50+
38	UK-UA-2-17	Eugenia	West London	Cafes/restaurant	Notes	English	UK	No	UKR	F	50+
39	UK-UA-2-18	Eugenia	East London	Cafes/restaurant	Notes	English	UK	No	UKR	F	40-49
40	UK-UA-2-19	Eugenia	West London	Cafes/restaurant	Notes	English	UK	No	UKR	F	30-49
46	UK-UA-1-20	Eugenia	North-East London	Cafes/restaurant	Notes	English	UK	No	UKR	M	19-29
47	UK-UA-1-21	Eugenia	East London	Cafes/restaurant	Notes	English	UK	No	UKR	M	40-49
48	UK-PHI-2-22	Eugenia	North London	Associations/consulate	Notes	English	UK	No	PHI	F	30-49
49	UK-IN-1-23	Eugenia	North London	Home	Notes	English	UK	No	IND	M	50+
50	UK-IN-2-24	Eugenia	North London	Cafes/restaurant	Notes	English	UK	No	IND	F	40-49
51	UK-IN-1-25	Eugenia	North London	Cafes/restaurant	Notes	English	UK	No	IND	M	40-49
57	PHI-1-3	Jean	Internet - Facebook video call	Skype/FB video call	Notes	English and Filipino	UK	Yes	PHI	M	50+
60	IN-1-3	Geetika	New Delhi	Home	Taped & notes	English	UK	Yes	IND	M	40-49
61	IN-1-4	Geetika	New Delhi	Home	Taped & notes	English	UK	Yes	IND	M	19-29
63	IN-2-5	Geetika	Jaipur	Home	Taped & notes	English	UK	Yes	IND	F	19-29
64	IN-1-6	Geetika	New Delhi	Cafes/restaurant	Taped & notes	English	UK	Yes	IND	M	19-29
66	UK-BiH-2-26	Eugenia	East London	Cafes/restaurant	Notes	English	UK	No	BIH	F	19-29
68	UK-BiH-1-27	Eugenia	East London	Cafes/restaurant	Notes	English	UK	No	BIH	M	50+
71	UA-UK-2-5	Svitlana	Lviv		Taped & notes	Ukrainian	UK	Yes	UKR	F	50+


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73	UK-IN-2-28	Eugenia	East London	Workplace	Notes	English	UK	No	IND	F	19-29
74	UK-BiH-1-29	Eugenia	East London	Cafes/restaurant	Notes	English	UK	No	BIH	M	30-49
77	IN-1-7	Geetika	Mumbai	Skype/FB video call	Taped & notes	English	UK	Yes	IND	M	19-29
79	IN-1-8	Geetika	New Delhi	Workplace	Taped & notes	English	UK	Yes	IND	M	50+
84	UK-IN-1-30	Eugenia	North London	Partner's offices/University	Notes	English	UK	No	IND	M	19-29
95	UK-IN-1-1	Eugenia	Central London	Partner's offices/University	Notes	English	UK	No	IND	M	19-29
110	IN-1-9	Geetika	New Delhi	Workplace	Notes	English	UK	Yes	IND	M	50+
111	IN-2-10	Geetika	New Delhi	Workplace	Taped & notes	English	UK	Yes	IND	F	30-49
117	IN-2-11	Geetika	Kolkata	Skype/FB video call	Taped & notes	English	UK	Yes	IND	F	30-49
118	IN-2-12	Geetika	New Delhi	Workplace	Taped & notes	English	UK	Yes	IND	F	30-49
119	UK-PHI-1-31	Eugenia	Brighton	Other public places	Notes	English	UK	No	PHI	M	30-49
120	IN-2-13	Geetika	New Delhi	Home	Notes	English	UK	Yes	IND	F	30-49
121	IN-1-14	Geetika	New Delhi	Skype/FB video call	Notes	English	UK	Yes	IND	M	40-49
122	IN-2-15	Geetika	New Delhi	Workplace	Taped & notes	English	UK	Yes	IND	F	30-49
131	UK-PHI-2-33	Eugenia	Brighton	Cafes/restaurant	Notes	English	UK	No	PHI	F	40-49
135	UK-PHI-1-34	Eugenia	Brighton	Cafes/restaurant	Notes	English	UK	No	PHI	M	40-49
146	UK-PHI-2-32	Eugenia	Brighton	Cafes/restaurant	Notes	English	UK	No	PHI	F	30-49
149	UK-PHI-35	Eugenia	Brighton	Cafes/restaurant	Notes	English	UK	No	PHI	M	50+
153	UK-UA-2-36	Eugenia	Central London	Cafes/restaurant	Notes	Russian, English	UK	No	UKR	F	30-49
155	UK-PHI-1-38	Eugenia	Central London	Partner's offices/University	Notes	English	UK	No	PHI	M	50+
156	UK-BiH-1-37	Eugenia	City of London	Cafes/restaurant	Notes	English, Serbian	UK	No	BIH	M	40-49
157	UK-IN-1-39	Eugenia	North London	Cafes/restaurant	Notes	English	UK	No	IND	M	40-49
158	UK-PHI-2-40	Eugenia	West London	Cafes/restaurant	Notes	English	UK	No	PHI	F	30-49
160	UK-PHI-2-5	Jean	Internet - Skype	Skype/FB video call	Notes	English, Filipino	UK	No	PHI	F	40-49
174	UK-UA-1-50	Eugenia	Internet - Skype	Skype/FB video call	Notes	English	UK	No	UKR	M	30-49
179	UK-PHI-2-62	Eugenia	Salisbury	Skype/FB video call	Notes	English	UK	No	PHI	F	30-49
180	UK-IN-2-61	Eugenia	Uxbridge	Phone	Notes	English	UK	No	IND	F	30-49
181	UK-IN-1-45	Eugenia	Hounslow West, London	Cafes/restaurant	Notes	English	UK	No	IND	M	19-29
185	UK-IN-2-68	Eugenia	Brighton	Other public places	Notes	English	UK	No	IND	F	40-49
187	UK-BiH-1-74	Eugenia	West London	Other public places	Notes	English	UK	No	BIH	M	50+
188	UK-PHI-2-73	Eugenia	Outer London	Phone	Notes	English	UK	No	PHI	F	50+
189	UK-PHI-1-72	Eugenia	Outer London	Phone	Notes	English	UK	No	PHI	M	30-49
190	UK-IN-2-71	Eugenia	Cheshire	Phone	Notes	English	UK	No	IND	F	30-49
191	UK-IN-1-70	Eugenia	Outer London	Phone	Notes	English	UK	No	IND	M	30-49

192	UK-PHI-2-69	Eugenia	Outer London	Phone	Notes	English	UK	No	PHI	F	50+
193	UK-BiH-2-67	Eugenia	West London	Other public places	Notes	English	UK	No	BIH	F	50+
194	UK-BiH-1-66	Eugenia	West London	Other public places	Notes	English	UK	No	BIH	M	19-29
195	UK-BiH-1-65	Eugenia	West London	Other public places	Notes	English	UK	No	BIH	M	30-49
196	UK-UA-2-64	Eugenia	Whitfield	Phone	Notes	English	UK	No	UKR	F	30-49
197	UK-IN-2-63	Eugenia	Uxbridge	Phone	Notes	English	UK	No	IND	F	40-49
198	UK-IN-1-60	Eugenia	Oxford	Phone	Notes	English	UK	No	IND	M	40-49
202	UK-IN-2-41	Eugenia	Central London	Partner's offices/University	Notes	English	UK	No	IND	F	50+
203	UK-IN-2-56	Eugenia	Brighton	Partner's offices/University	Notes	English	UK	No	IND	F	40-49
204	UK-IN-1-57	Eugenia	West London	Phone	Notes	English	UK	No	IND	M	40-49
205	UK-IN-2-54	Eugenia	Brighton	Partner's offices/University	Notes	English	UK	No	IND	F	30-49
207	UK-IN-2-53	Eugenia	Lancaster	Skype/FB video call	Notes	English	UK	No	IND	F	30-49
266	UK-IN-1-75	Eugenia	Outer London	Skype/FB video call	Notes	English	UK	No	IND	F	19-29
267	UK-IN-2-55	Eugenia	Hove	Home	Notes	English	UK	No	IND	F	50+
268	UK-BiH-2-77	Eugenia	Outer London	Phone	Notes	English	UK	No	BIH	F	19-29
270	UK-IN-1-48	Eugenia	North London	Phone	Notes	English	UK	No	IND	M	19-29
271	UK-PHI-2-79	Eugenia	Milton Keynes	Phone	Notes	English	UK	No	PHI	F	30-49
273	UK-IN-1-44	Eugenia	Hounslow West, London	Cafes/restaurant	Notes	English	UK	No	IND	M	30-49
274	UK-IN-1-49	Eugenia	East London	Cafes/restaurant	Notes	English	UK	No	IND	M	30-49
280	UK-IN-2-78	Eugenia	Brighton	Cafes/restaurant	Notes	English	UK	No	IND	F	40-49
281	UK-IN-1-47	Eugenia	London	Phone	Notes	English	UK	No	IND	M	30-49
282	UK-IN1-46	Eugenia	Outer London	Phone	Notes	English	UK	No	IND	M	50+
283	UK-IN-2-76	Eugenia	Bristol	Skype/FB video call	Notes	English	UK	No	IND	F	30-49
284	UK-BiH-1-80	Eugenia	London	Phone	Notes	English	UK	No	BIH	M	30-49
285	UK-BiH-2-81	Eugenia	Hove	Cafes/restaurant	Notes	English	UK	No	BIH	F	40-49
286	UK-IN-2-58	Eugenia	Manchester	Skype/FB video call	Notes	English	UK	No	IND	F	30-49
288	UK-IN-2-51	Eugenia	West London	Cafes/restaurant	Notes	English	UK	No	IND	F	30-49
289	UK-IN-1-59	Eugenia	Manchester	Phone	Notes	English	UK	No	IND	M	30-49
294	UK-IN-2-42	Eugenia	Central London	Cafes/restaurant	Notes	English	UK	No	IND	F	30-49
308	UK-IN-1-43	Eugenia	East London	Cafes/restaurant	Notes	English	UK	No	IND	M	30-49
310	UK-IN-2-52	Eugenia	Brighton	Cafes/restaurant	Notes	English	UK	No	IND	F	40-49

## Annex II: UK Sample Recruitment 'Tree'





Note:

- green - team's personal contacts with the communities
- black - direct contacts ('cold calls')
- red - NGOs assistance or respondent that triggered 'snowballing'
- purple - interviews by the Researcher in the Philippines

N=83

By Eugenia Markova.

### **Annex III: List of associations in the UK**

#### *List of some Bosnian-Herzegovinian groups in the UK*

- The Bosnian Institute, a UK charity founded in 1997, carries out a broad range of activities, with financial support from the Packard Humanities Institute<sup>24</sup>.
- BH Community UK<sup>25</sup> was formed following the arrival of Bosnian migrants after the civil war and provides practical, social and psychological help to Bosnians now living in London. It also offers information and advice to the general public on matters related to Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- The Bosnia-Herzegovina UK Network is an umbrella organisation for voluntary groups operating in the UK. It was established in 1996 and its main objectives are the promotion of any charitable purpose to benefit Bosnians and other ethnic minority groups in the United Kingdom<sup>26</sup>.
- There is a BiH Islamic Centre in London which was founded in 1995 with the aim of preserving Bosnian Islamic values and traditions.

#### *List of some Filipino groups in the UK*

- Kanlungan (Alliance of Filipino Organisations)<sup>27</sup>
- Lahing Kayumanggi dance company focusing on traditional Filipino dance<sup>28</sup>
- EA Doce Pares, an Eskrima/Arnis school promoting and educating the community on the Philippine warrior arts and culture<sup>29</sup>
- Phil-UK, a group for young and second-generation Filipinos in the UK
- Philippine Generations, a Second Generation led not for profit Organisation promoting the Philippines, its people and culture in the UK
- The Philippine Centre, a charity promoting culture and community spirit

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<sup>24</sup> <http://www.bosnia.org.uk/about/default.cfm>

<sup>25</sup> See: <http://www.bhcuk.com/index.html>

<sup>26</sup> [www.bhuknetwork.org](http://www.bhuknetwork.org)

<sup>27</sup> <http://www.kanlungan.org.uk>

<sup>28</sup> <http://phil-uk.com>

<sup>29</sup> <http://www.eadocepare.com>

*List of some Ukrainian groups in the UK*

- Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain (AUGB)<sup>30</sup>. The AUGB has branches in more than 20 towns in England and Wales. It was founded in 1946 by Ukrainians who came to the UK at the end of the 2<sup>nd</sup> World War. It publishes a regular bilingual newspaper and works closely with other Ukrainian organizations organising events to commemorate aspects of Ukrainian history and culture. It supports a number of Ukrainian community schools.
- Association of Ukrainian Women in Great Britain<sup>31</sup>
- The Association of Ukrainian Teachers and Educators<sup>32</sup>
- Ukrainian Migrants Network (UMN).

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<sup>30</sup> <http://www.augb.co.uk/index.php>

<sup>31</sup> <http://www.augb.co.uk/ukrainian-women.php>

<sup>32</sup> <http://www.augb.co.uk/association-of-ukrainian-teachers-and-educators.php>

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