Jean Monnet/GGP Fellow
Geraldo Vidigal is a Dispute Settlement Lawyer with the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Geneva. Previously he was Associate Editor with EJIL:Talk! – Blog of the European Journal of International Law, as well as Senior Research Fellow with the Max Planck Institute in Luxembourg.
From 2014 to 2015 he was a Jean Monnet Fellow, associated to the Global Governance Programme.
Geraldo obtained his PhD from the University of Cambridge with a dissertation on judicial remedies for non-compliance in international law. He holds a Bachelor in Law degree from the University of São Paulo and a Master’s degree in International Law (with High Honours) from the Sorbonne Law School (Paris 1). His research focuses on international dispute settlement and the role of international courts and tribunals within international legal regimes.
Prior to joining the EUI, he was a Marie Curie Fellow at Bocconi University, Milan, under the DISSETTLE Programme on the Law and Economics of Dispute Settlement in International Trade, and a Visiting Scholar at the World Trade Organization’s Economic Research and Statistics Division. He has recently published in the European Journal of International Law, Journal of International Economic Law, Italian Yearbook of International Law, and Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law.
Remedies and Compliance in International Economic Governance
This project addresses the responses available to international adjudicators in case states fail to perform their obligations. It aims at understanding the role of international adjudicatory bodies in the process of inducing compliance by states with international legal rules, and the impact of legal design and judicial responses to breach on the overall legal regime.
The project examines in particular the relationship between two different ideal-types of judicial remedies. Prospective remedies aim at ensuring that violators cease their unlawful conduct and resume performance of their obligations. Through retrospective remedies, courts and tribunals determine the reparation that a wrongdoer must provide to parties injured by a breach.
International economic law has traditionally applied the two remedies as alternatives, with a quasi-exclusivity of prospective remedies in trade law and a strong emphasis on retrospective remedies in investment law. However, it is doubtful whether prospective remedies are always adequate for trade disputes, or retrospective one for investment disputes. The project discusses the potential for courts and tribunals to employ each type of remedy, and the implications for the ensuing legal regime of emphasising one or the other type of remedy.